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Neoliberalismo Europeo y la Transición Española Vista desde el Enfoque de Clase y Explotación

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  • Howard Petith

Abstract

Recientemente, ha aparecido en la corriente principal de la economía, un nuevo enfoque que se expresa en términos de clase y explotación y que se basa en un modelo analítico complejo y sofisticado. El objetivo de este artículo es exponer dos ejemplos de este enfoque de forma simplificada y demostrar cómo explican la tendencia neoliberal reciente de la Unión Europea y la transición Española desde la dictadura hacia la democracia.

Suggested Citation

  • Howard Petith, 2007. "Neoliberalismo Europeo y la Transición Española Vista desde el Enfoque de Clase y Explotación," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 687.07, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    • Handle: RePEc:aub:autbar:687.07
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2001. "A Theory of Political Transitions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(4), pages 938-963, September.
    2. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2000. "Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 115(4), pages 1167-1199.
    3. Saez, Emmanuel & Alvaredo, Facundo, 2006. "Income and Wealth Concentration in Spain in a Historical and Fiscal Perspective," CEPR Discussion Papers 5836, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Neoliberalisme; Transición Española;

    JEL classification:

    • E11 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General Aggregative Models - - - Marxian; Sraffian; Kaleckian
    • O52 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Europe
    • N93 - Economic History - - Regional and Urban History - - - Europe: Pre-1913

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