Elimination of non-individualistic preferences in large population aggregative games

We study evolution of preferences in large population aggregative games. In such games, all agents in society interact with each other. The material payoff or fitness of agents is entirely individualistic. Subjective payoffs, which represent preferences, depend upon a non-individualistic component which is adjusted through a type-dependent preference parameter. Using the indirect evolutionary approach, we show that the individualistic type enjoys fitness dominance under any type distribution in such games. Hence, under a class of evolutionary dynamics that satisfy monotone percentage growth, all non-individualistic types are eliminated. We apply this analysis to two classes of non-individualistic preferences-altruistic and Kantian. Altruistic preferences put a positive weight on the externality imposed on society while Kantian preferences incorporate the Kantian categorical imperative. In two important economic models, the tragedy of the commons and the public goods game, we show that both these classes of preferences are eliminated.