On voting rules satisfying false-name-proofness and participation
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- Agustín Bonifacio & Federico Fioravanti, 2025. "On Voting Rules Satisfying False-Name-Proofness and Participation," Working Papers 356, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
- Agustín G. Bonifacio & Federico Fioravanti, 2025. "On voting rules satisfying false-name-proofness and participation," Working Papers 2509, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Yokoo, Makoto & Sakurai, Yuko & Matsubara, Shigeo, 2004. "The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: new fraud in internet auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 174-188, January.
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JEL classification:
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
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