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A cloud dynamic online double auction mechanism (DODAM) for sustainable pricing

Author

Listed:
  • S. M. Reza Dibaj

    (Ryerson University)

  • Ali Miri

    (Ryerson University)

  • SeyedAkbar Mostafavi

    (Yazd University)

Abstract

The Cloud is a new computing paradigm that has experienced exponential growth in recent years. Therefore, success in the cloud services industry can be a challenge, as satisfying both cloud service users and providers is challenging. Cloud users expect to receive a higher service quality with the lowest possible prices. On the other hand, cloud service providers need to maximize their revenues by utilizing energy-efficient resources while adopting prices that attract the most customers. As such, the success of a business in cloud computing depends on the equal consideration of cloud service providers’ and users’ needs. This paper proposes a long-term organic solution based on a double auction model that encompasses the varying natures of both strategic players and cloud resources. We develop the dynamic online double auction mechanism (DODAM) and coin the concept of sustainable pricing for cloud computing services. A dynamic online platform that is capable of realistically modelling cloud ecosystems distinguishes the DODAM model from other studies using a double auction mechanism. Based on experimental results, we prove that the proposed model outweighs other double auction models in terms of the social welfare and truthfulness pillars.

Suggested Citation

  • S. M. Reza Dibaj & Ali Miri & SeyedAkbar Mostafavi, 2020. "A cloud dynamic online double auction mechanism (DODAM) for sustainable pricing," Telecommunication Systems: Modelling, Analysis, Design and Management, Springer, vol. 75(4), pages 461-480, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:telsys:v:75:y:2020:i:4:d:10.1007_s11235-020-00688-4
    DOI: 10.1007/s11235-020-00688-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Sushil Bikhchandani & Shurojit Chatterji & Ron Lavi & Ahuva Mu'alem & Noam Nisan & Arunava Sen, 2006. "Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(4), pages 1109-1132, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ding, Xiaoshu & Qi, Qi & Jian, Sisi, 2024. "Truthful online double auctions for on-demand integrated ride-sourcing platforms," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 317(3), pages 737-747.

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