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The Cost of Climate Action: Experimental Evidence on the Impact of Climate Information on Charitable Donations to Climate Activism

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  • Samantha Gonsalves Wetherell
  • Anna Josephson

Abstract

We examine the propensity of individuals to donate to climate activism, evaluating the impact of different informational treatments on an incentive compatible charitable donation and stated climate change-related concerns. Participants were evaluated on climate literacy and general climate attitudes before being randomly assigned to a treatment which provided either education or neutral language about climate change, either with or without images of protest. After the treatment, participants engaged in an incentive compatible dictator game. We find that participants gave more to climate activism than seen in previous dictator game and charitable giving experiments, in both average amount given and proportion of participants who gave their entire endowment. However, we determine that climate activism information negatively influenced the amount of money donated. We also found that protest imagery moderated this negative effect and had a positive significant effect of increasing participants' climate concern. Finally, we found that the climate concern was significantly positively correlated with donations, while being a male was significantly negatively associated with donation amounts.

Suggested Citation

  • Samantha Gonsalves Wetherell & Anna Josephson, 2024. "The Cost of Climate Action: Experimental Evidence on the Impact of Climate Information on Charitable Donations to Climate Activism," Papers 2409.17378, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2409.17378
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Penelope Buckley, 2020. "Prices, information and nudges for residential electricity conservation : A meta-analysis," Post-Print hal-02500507, HAL.
    2. John A. List, 2007. "On the Interpretation of Giving in Dictator Games," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 115(3), pages 482-493.
    3. repec:kap:iaecre:v:13:y:2007:i:2:p:171-182 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Debra Israel, 2007. "Charitable Donations: Evidence of Demand for Environmental Protection?," International Advances in Economic Research, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 13(2), pages 171-182, May.
    5. Steven D. Levitt & John A. List, 2007. "What Do Laboratory Experiments Measuring Social Preferences Reveal About the Real World?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 21(2), pages 153-174, Spring.
    6. Buckley, Penelope, 2020. "Prices, information and nudges for residential electricity conservation: A meta-analysis," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 172(C).
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