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Costly Signalling in DAOs

Author

Listed:
  • Darcy W. E. Allen
  • Jason Potts
  • Julian Waters-Lynch
  • Max Parasol

Abstract

Decentralised Autonomous Organisations (DAOs) are a new type of digital organisation that uses blockchain infrastructure (e.g. smart contracts, tokens) to coordinate a group of people around a shared mission. Like all organisations, DAOs must attract sources of funding and other resources, and discover and retain a talented community and workforce. To do this, they must signal their true quality. Yet the characteristics of the environment that DAOs operate in (pseudonymous actors, global scale, permissionless entry and exit) makes this difficult. We apply costly signalling theory to explore the information asymmetry problem in DAOs and some of the strategies (behaviours and investments) and institutional solutions (including better signalling mechanisms) that have evolved to solve this problem.

Suggested Citation

  • Darcy W. E. Allen & Jason Potts & Julian Waters-Lynch & Max Parasol, 2024. "Costly Signalling in DAOs," Papers 2406.18457, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2406.18457
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    References listed on IDEAS

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