Price & Choose
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- Federico Echenique & Matías Núñez, 2024. "Price & Choose," Working Papers 2024-15, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
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Cited by:
- Jens E. Pedersen & Steven Abreu & Matthias Jobst & Gregor Lenz & Vittorio Fra & Felix Christian Bauer & Dylan Richard Muir & Peng Zhou & Bernhard Vogginger & Kade Heckel & Gianvito Urgese & Sadasivan , 2024. "Neuromorphic intermediate representation: A unified instruction set for interoperable brain-inspired computing," Nature Communications, Nature, vol. 15(1), pages 1-15, December.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-DES-2023-01-16 (Economic Design)
- NEP-GTH-2023-01-16 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2023-01-16 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-UPT-2023-01-16 (Utility Models and Prospect Theory)
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