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The Economics of Orbit Use: Open Access, External Costs, and Runaway Debris Growth

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  • Akhil Rao
  • Giacomo Rondina

Abstract

We present a dynamic physico-economic model of Earth orbit use with endogenous satellite collision risk to study conditions under which debris-producing collisions between orbiting bodies result in debris growth that may render Earth's orbits unusable, an outcome known as Kessler Syndrome. We characterize the dynamics of objects in orbit under open access as well as when external costs -- the impact of an additional satellite launch on the collision risk faced by all satellites -- are internalized, and we show that Kessler Syndrome can emerge in both cases. Finally, we show that once the economic incentives of satellite launching are modeled, for Kessler Syndrome to emerge, autocatalytic debris growth is essential. In our main calibration, Kessler Syndrome can emerge anytime between the year 2040 and the year 2184, with the precise date being very sensitive to the calibration of autocatalytic debris growth parameters.

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  • Akhil Rao & Giacomo Rondina, 2022. "The Economics of Orbit Use: Open Access, External Costs, and Runaway Debris Growth," Papers 2202.07442, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2023.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2202.07442
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    Cited by:

    1. Julien Guyot & Akhil Rao & Sebastien Rouillon, 2022. "The long-run economics of sustainable orbit use," Working Papers hal-03896730, HAL.
    2. Akhil Rao & Mark Moretto & Marcus Holzinger & Daniel Kaffine & Brian Weeden, 2023. "OPUS: An Integrated Assessment Model for Satellites and Orbital Debris," Papers 2309.10252, arXiv.org.

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