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A Simple Model of Monetary Policy under Phillips-Curve Causal Disagreements

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  • Ran Spiegler

Abstract

I study a static textbook model of monetary policy and relax the conventional assumption that the private sector has rational expectations. Instead, the private sector forms inflation forecasts according to a misspecified subjective model that disagrees with the central bank's (true) model over the causal underpinnings of the Phillips Curve. Following the AI/Statistics literature on Bayesian Networks, I represent the private sector's model by a direct acyclic graph (DAG). I show that when the private sector's model reverses the direction of causality between inflation and output, the central bank's optimal policy can exhibit an attenuation effect that is sensitive to the noisiness of the true inflation-output equations.

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  • Ran Spiegler, 2021. "A Simple Model of Monetary Policy under Phillips-Curve Causal Disagreements," Papers 2105.08988, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2105.08988
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Ran Spiegler, 2016. "Bayesian Networks and Boundedly Rational Expectations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 131(3), pages 1243-1290.
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    12. J. Tetlow, Robert & von zur Muehlen, Peter, 2001. "Robust monetary policy with misspecified models: Does model uncertainty always call for attenuated policy?," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 25(6-7), pages 911-949, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Alistair Macaulay, 2022. "Heterogeneous Information, Subjective Model Beliefs, and the Time-Varying Transmission of Shocks," CESifo Working Paper Series 9733, CESifo.
    2. Stephane Dupraz & Sophie Guilloux-Nefussi & Adrian Penalver, 2023. "A Pitfall of Cautiousness in Monetary Policy∗," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 19(3), pages 269-323, August.

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