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A characterization of absorbing sets in coalition formation games

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  • Agustin G. Bonifacio
  • Elena Inarra
  • Pablo Neme

Abstract

Given a standard myopic dynamic process among coalition structures, an absorbing set is a minimal collection of such structures that is never left once entered through that process. Absorbing sets are an important solution concept in coalition formation games, but they have drawbacks: they can be large and hard to obtain. In this paper, we characterize an absorbing set in terms of a collection consisting of a small number of sets of coalitions that we refer to as a "reduced form" of a game. We apply our characterization to study convergence to stability in several economic environments.

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  • Agustin G. Bonifacio & Elena Inarra & Pablo Neme, 2020. "A characterization of absorbing sets in coalition formation games," Papers 2009.11689, arXiv.org, revised May 2024.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2009.11689
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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