IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/arx/papers/1702.03977.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Labor Contract Law -An Economic View

Author

Listed:
  • Yaofeng Fu
  • Ruokun Huang
  • Yiran Sheng

Abstract

China's new labor law -- Labor Contract Law has been put into practice for over one year. Since its inception, debates have been whirling around the nation, if not the world. In this article, we take an economic perspective to analyze the possible impact of the core item -- open-ended employment contract, and we find that it deals poorly with adverse selection, with moral hazard problems arise, which fails to meet the expectations of law-makers and other parties.

Suggested Citation

  • Yaofeng Fu & Ruokun Huang & Yiran Sheng, 2017. "Labor Contract Law -An Economic View," Papers 1702.03977, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:1702.03977
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://arxiv.org/pdf/1702.03977
    File Function: Latest version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bengt Holmstrom, 1979. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 74-91, Spring.
    2. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
    3. Bruce C. Greenwald, 1986. "Adverse Selection in the Labour Market," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 53(3), pages 325-347.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. repec:eee:labchp:v:3:y:1999:i:pb:p:2373-2437 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Dionne, Georges, 2012. "The empirical measure of information problems with emphasis on insurance fraud and dynamic data," Working Papers 12-10, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
    3. Dionne, Georges, 1998. "La mesure empirique des problèmes d’information," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 74(4), pages 585-606, décembre.
    4. Dato, Simon & Grunewald, Andreas & Kräkel, Matthias & Müller, Daniel, 2016. "Asymmetric employer information, promotions, and the wage policy of firms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 273-300.
    5. Dongyuan Zhan & Amy R. Ward, 2019. "Staffing, Routing, and Payment to Trade off Speed and Quality in Large Service Systems," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 67(6), pages 1738-1751, November.
    6. Oyer, Paul & Schaefer, Scott, 2011. "Personnel Economics: Hiring and Incentives," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 20, pages 1769-1823, Elsevier.
    7. Omar Al-Ubaydli & John A. List, 2019. "How natural field experiments have enhanced our understanding of unemployment," Nature Human Behaviour, Nature, vol. 3(1), pages 33-39, January.
    8. Ece ZEYBEK YILMAZ & Göksel ATAMAN BERK, 2020. "Vekâlet Kuramına Göre Türkiye’deki Otellerin Pazara Giriş Stratejilerinin Değerlendirilmesi," Istanbul Management Journal, Istanbul University Business School, vol. 0(88), pages 145-168, June.
    9. Olsthoorn, Mark & Schleich, Joachim & Hirzel, Simon, 2017. "Adoption of Energy Efficiency Measures for Non-residential Buildings: Technological and Organizational Heterogeneity in the Trade, Commerce and Services Sector," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 240-254.
    10. Edward P. Lazear, 1995. "Personnel Economics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121883, December.
    11. Robert C. Merton & Richard T. Thakor, 2015. "Customers and Investors: A Framework for Understanding Financial Institutions," NBER Working Papers 21258, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Alexander Galetovic & Ángel Cabrera, "undated". "Tópicos en la Economía de la Investigación Tecnológica," Documentos de Trabajo 121, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
    13. Daniel McFadden & Carlos Noton & Pau Olivella, "undated". "Remedies for Sick Insurance," Working Papers 620, Barcelona School of Economics.
    14. Prasenjit Banerjee & Vegard Iversen & Sandip Mitra & Antonio Nicolò & Kunal Sen, 2018. "Politicians and Their Promises in an Uncertain World: Evidence from a Lab-in-the-Field Experiment in India," Economics Discussion Paper Series 1806, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    15. Fortin, B. & Lanoie, P., 1998. "Effects of Workers' Compensation : A Survey," Papers 9816, Laval - Recherche en Politique Economique.
    16. Matyukha, Andriy, 2017. "Business groups in agriculture impact of ownership structures on performance: The case of Russia's agroholdings," Studies on the Agricultural and Food Sector in Transition Economies 254051, Institute of Agricultural Development in Transition Economies (IAMO).
    17. Ian Jewitt & Clare Leaver & Heski Bar-Isaac, 2014. "Asymmetric Information and Adverse Selection," Economics Series Working Papers 695, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    18. Vegas, E & Ganimian, A. J., 2013. "Theory and Evidence on Teacher Policies in Developed and Developing Countries," Working Paper 104291, Harvard University OpenScholar.
    19. Christopher L. House & Jing Zhang, 2012. "Layoffs, Lemons and Temps," NBER Working Papers 17962, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    20. Liran Einav & Amy Finkelstein, 2018. "Moral Hazard in Health Insurance: What We Know and How We Know It," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 16(4), pages 957-982.
    21. Ekinci, Emre, 2019. "Discretionary bonuses and turnover," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 30-49.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:arx:papers:1702.03977. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: arXiv administrators (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://arxiv.org/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.