The Economics of Private Sector Training: A Survey of the Literature
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.1111/j.0950-0804.2005.00240.x
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982.
"Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
- Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000387, David K. Levine.
- Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 252, David K. Levine.
- Ken Binmore & Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1986. "The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(2), pages 176-188, Summer.
- Daron Acemoglu & Jorn-Steffen Pischke, 1999.
"The Structure of Wages and Investment in General Training,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(3), pages 539-572, June.
- Acemoglu, D. & Pischke, J.S., 1997. "The Structure of Wages and Investment in General Training," Working papers 97-24, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Acemoglu, Daron & Pischke, Jörn-Steffen, 1998. "The Structure of Wages and Investment in General Training," CEPR Discussion Papers 1833, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Daron Acemoglu & Jorn-Steffen Pischke, 1998. "The Structure of Wages and Investment in General Training," NBER Working Papers 6357, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Stevens, Margaret, 2001.
"Should Firms Be Required to Pay for Vocational Training?,"
Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(473), pages 485-505, July.
- Stevens, Margaret, 1999. "Should Firms be Required to Pay for Vocational Training?," CEPR Discussion Papers 2099, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Stevens, M., 1999. "Should Firms be Required to Pay for Vocational Training?," Economics Papers 1999-w4, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
- Daron Acemoglu & Jörn-Steffen Pischke, 1998.
"Why Do Firms Train? Theory and Evidence,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 113(1), pages 79-119.
- Daron Acemoglu & Jorn-Steffen Pischke, 1996. "Why Do Firms Train? Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 5605, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Acemoglu, D. & Pischki, J.S., 1996. "Why Do Firms Train? Theory and Evidence," Working papers 96-7, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Acemoglu, Daron & Pischke, Jörn-Steffen, 1996. "Why do Firms Train? Theory and Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 1460, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Myerson, Roger B. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1983.
"Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 265-281, April.
- Roger B. Myerson & Mark A. Satterthwaite, 1981. "Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading," Discussion Papers 469S, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- David H. Autor, 2001.
"Why Do Temporary Help Firms Provide Free General Skills Training?,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 116(4), pages 1409-1448.
- David H. Autor, 2000. "Why Do Temporary Help Firms Provide Free General Skills Training?," NBER Working Papers 7637, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Schlicht, Ekkehart, 1996.
"Endogenous on-the-job training with moral hazard,"
Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 81-92, August.
- Schlicht, Ekkehart, 1992. "Endogenous On-the-Job Training with Moral Hazard," Publications of Darmstadt Technical University, Institute for Business Studies (BWL) 37767, Darmstadt Technical University, Department of Business Administration, Economics and Law, Institute for Business Studies (BWL).
- Schlicht, Ekkehart, 1992. "Endogenous On-the-Job Training with Moral Hazard," Darmstadt Discussion Papers in Economics 69, Darmstadt University of Technology, Department of Law and Economics.
- Hashimoto, Masanori, 1981. "Firm-Specific Human Capital as a Shared Investment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 475-482, June.
- Daron Acemoglu, 1997. "Training and Innovation in an Imperfect Labour Market," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 64(3), pages 445-464.
- Parsons, Donald O, 1972. "Specific Human Capital: An Application to Quit Rates and Layoff Rates," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 80(6), pages 1120-1143, Nov.-Dec..
- Chun Chang & Wang, Yijiang, 1995. "A framework for understanding differences in labor turnover and human capital investment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 91-105, September.
- Katz, Eliakim & Ziderman, Adrian, 1990. "Investment in General Training: The Role of Information and Labour Mobility," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 100(403), pages 1147-1158, December.
- Bruce C. Greenwald, 1986. "Adverse Selection in the Labour Market," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 53(3), pages 325-347.
- Grout, Paul A, 1984. "Investment and Wages in the Absence of Binding Contracts: A Nash Bargining Approach," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(2), pages 449-460, March.
- Hall, Robert E & Lazear, Edward P, 1984.
"The Excess Sensitivity of Layoffs and Quits to Demand,"
Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 2(2), pages 233-257, April.
- Robert E. Hall & Edward P. Lazear, 1982. "The Excess Sensitivity of Layoffs and Quits to Demand," NBER Working Papers 0864, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Lorne Carmichael, 1983.
"Firm-Specific Human Capital and Promotion Ladders,"
Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(1), pages 251-258, Spring.
- Lorne Carmichael, 1981. "Firm-Specific Human Capital and Promotion Ladders," Working Paper 452, Economics Department, Queen's University.
- repec:eee:labchp:v:1:y:1986:i:c:p:603-640 is not listed on IDEAS
- Stevens, Margaret, 1994. "A Theoretical Model of On-the-Job Training with Imperfect Competition," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(4), pages 537-562, October.
- Chang, Chun & Wang, Yijiang, 1996. "Human Capital Investment under Asymmetric Information: The Pigovian Conjecture Revisited," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 14(3), pages 505-519, July.
- George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
- MacLeod, W. Bentley & Malcomson, James M., 1993. "Specific investment and wage profiles in labour markets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 37(2-3), pages 343-354, April.
- Gary S. Becker, 1962.
"Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis,"
NBER Chapters, in: Investment in Human Beings, pages 9-49,
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gary S. Becker, 1962. "Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 70(5), pages 1-9.
- Acemoglu, Daron & Pischke, Jorn-Steffen, 2000.
"Certification of training and training outcomes,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(4-6), pages 917-927, May.
- Daron Acemoglu & Joern-Steffen Pischke, 1999. "Certification of Training and Training Outcomes," Working papers 99-28, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Acemoglu, Daron & Pischke, Jorn-Steffen, 1999.
"Beyond Becker: Training in Imperfect Labour Markets,"
Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(453), pages 112-142, February.
- Daron Acemoglu & Joern-Steffen Pischke, 1998. "Beyond Becker: Training in Imperfect Labor Markets," Working papers 98-12, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Daron Acemoglu & Jorn-Steffen Pischke, 1998. "Beyond Becker: Training in Imperfect Labor Markets," NBER Working Papers 6740, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Becker, Gary S & Landes, Elisabeth M & Michael, Robert T, 1977. "An Economic Analysis of Marital Instability," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(6), pages 1141-1187, December.
- Booth, Alison L & Chatterji, Monojit, 1998. "Unions and Efficient Training," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(447), pages 328-343, March.
- Hessel Oosterbeek & Edwin Leuven, 2001. "Firm-Specific Human Capital as a Shared Investment: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(1), pages 342-347, March.
- Katz, Eliakim & Ziderman, Adrian, 1990. "Shared investment in general training : the role of information," Policy Research Working Paper Series 535, The World Bank.
- Canice Prendergast, 1993. "The Role of Promotion in Inducing Specific Human Capital Acquisition," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 108(2), pages 523-534.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Jung-Seung Yang, 2022. "Dynamics of Firm’s Investment in Education and Training: An Agent-based Approach," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 60(4), pages 1317-1351, December.
- repec:eee:labchp:v:3:y:1999:i:pb:p:2373-2437 is not listed on IDEAS
- Dan A. Black & Lars Skipper & Jeffrey A. Smith & Jeffrey Andrew Smith, 2023. "Firm Training," CESifo Working Paper Series 10268, CESifo.
- Yanick Labrie & Claude Montmarquette, 2005. "La formation qualifiante et transférable en milieu de travail," CIRANO Project Reports 2005rp-04, CIRANO.
- Anke S. Kessler & Christoph Lülfesmann, 2006.
"The Theory of Human Capital Revisited: on the Interaction of General and Specific Investments,"
Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(514), pages 903-923, October.
- Christoph Luelfesmann, 2000. "The Theory of Human Capital Revisited: On the Interaction of General and Specific Investments," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0659, Econometric Society.
- Anke S. Kessler & Christoph Lülfesmann, 2002. "The Theory of Human Capital Revisited: On the Interaction of General and Specific Investments," CESifo Working Paper Series 776, CESifo.
- Kessler, Anke & Lülfesmann, Christoph, 2000. "The Theory of Human Capital Revisited: On the Interaction of General and Specific Investments," CEPR Discussion Papers 2533, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Giorgio Brunello & Maria De Paola, 2004. "Market Failures and the Under-Provision of Training," CESifo Working Paper Series 1286, CESifo.
- Giulio Pedrini, 2017. "Law and economics of training: a taxonomy of the main legal and institutional tools addressing suboptimal investments in human capital development," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 43(1), pages 83-105, February.
- Dietz, Daniel & Zwick, Thomas, 2016.
"The retention effect of training: Portability, visibility, and credibility,"
ZEW Discussion Papers
16-011, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
- Zwick, Thomas, 2017. "The retention effect of training – portability, visibility, and credibility," VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168100, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Daniel Dietz & Thomas Zwick, 2016. "The retention effect of training – portability, visibility, and credibility," Economics of Education Working Paper Series 0113, University of Zurich, Department of Business Administration (IBW).
- Rao, Neel, 2015. "General training in labor markets: Common value auctions with unobservable investment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 19-45.
- Picchio, Matteo & van Ours, Jan C., 2011.
"Market imperfections and firm-sponsored training,"
Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(5), pages 712-722, October.
- Picchio, Matteo & van Ours, Jan C., 2010. "Market Imperfections and Firm-Sponsored Training," IZA Discussion Papers 4988, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Picchio, M. & van Ours, J.C., 2010. "Market Imperfections and Firm-Sponsored Training," Other publications TiSEM 81b2ea8b-3bb0-4c10-a87f-2, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Matteo PICCHIO & Jan C. VAN OURS, 2010. "Market imperfections and firm-sponsored training," LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES 2010026, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
- Picchio, M. & van Ours, J.C., 2010. "Market Imperfections and Firm-Sponsored Training," Discussion Paper 2010-57, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- van Ours, Jan C. & Picchio, Matteo, 2010. "Market imperfections and firm-sponsored training," CEPR Discussion Papers 7881, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Malcomson, James M. & Maw, James W. & McCormick, Barry, 2003.
"General training by firms, apprentice contracts, and public policy,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 197-227, April.
- James Malcomson & James W. Maw & University of Swansea Wales & Barry McCormick & University of Southampton, 2002. "General Training by Firms, Apprentice Contracts, and Public Policy," Economics Series Working Papers 86, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- James M. Malcomson & James W. Maw & Barry McCormick, 2002. "General Training by Firms, Apprentice Contracts, and Public Policy," CESifo Working Paper Series 696, CESifo.
- Tobias Hiller, 2023. "Training, Abilities and the Structure of Teams," Games, MDPI, vol. 14(3), pages 1-8, May.
- Muehlemann, Samuel & Pfeifer, Harald & Walden, Günter & Wenzelmann, Felix & Wolter, Stefan C., 2010. "The financing of apprenticeship training in the light of labor market regulations," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(5), pages 799-809, October.
- C. Simon Fan & Xiangdong Wei, 2010. "Training and worker effort: a signalling perspective," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 43(2), pages 604-621, May.
- Filipe Almeida‐Santos & Karen A. Mumford, 2004. "Employee Training in Australia: Evidence from AWIRS," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 80(s1), pages 53-64, September.
- Cecilia ALBERT & Carlos GARCÍA-SERRANO & Virginia HERNANZ, 2010. "On-the-job training in Europe: Determinants and wage returns," International Labour Review, International Labour Organization, vol. 149(3), pages 315-341, September.
- Jäger, Simon & Heining, Jörg, 2019.
"How Substitutable Are Workers? Evidence from Worker Deaths,"
MPRA Paper
109757, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 01 Jan 2019.
- Jäger, Simon & Heining, Jörg, 2022. "How Substitutable Are Workers? Evidence from Worker Deaths," IZA Discussion Papers 15717, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Simon Jäger & Jörg Heining, 2022. "How Substitutable Are Workers? Evidence from Worker Deaths," CESifo Working Paper Series 10126, CESifo.
- Simon Jäger & Jörg Heining, 2022. "How Substitutable Are Workers? Evidence from Worker Deaths," NBER Working Papers 30629, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jäger, Simon & Heining, Jörg, 2022. "How Substitutable Are Workers? - Evidence from Worker Deaths," IAB-Discussion Paper 202226, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany].
- Caliendo, Marco & Cobb-Clark, Deborah A. & Pfeifer, Harald & Uhlendorff, Arne & Wehner, Caroline, 2024.
"Managers’ risk preferences and firm training investments,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 161(C).
- Caliendo, Marco & Cobb-Clark, Deborah A. & Pfeifer, Harald & Uhlendorff, Arne & Wehner, Caroline, 2022. "Managers' Risk Preferences and Firm Training Investments," IZA Discussion Papers 15043, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Marco Caliendo & Deborah Cobb-Clark & Harald Pfeifer & Arne Uhlendorff & Caroline Wehner, 2024. "Managers’ risk preferences and firm training investments," Post-Print hal-04354612, HAL.
- Marco Caliendo & Deborah A. Cobb-Clark & Harald Pfeifer & Arne Uhlendorff & Caroline Wehner, 2022. "Managers’ Risk Preferences and Firm Training Investments," CEPA Discussion Papers 44, Center for Economic Policy Analysis.
- Thomas J. Carter, 2021. "Delayed firm‐paid general training," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 87(3), pages 937-951, January.
- Rita Asplund, 2005. "The Provision and Effects of Company Training: A Brief Review of the Literature," Nordic Journal of Political Economy, Nordic Journal of Political Economy, vol. 31, pages 47-73.
- Mitkova, Mariya, 2020. "Social Optimum in a Model with Hierarchical Firms and Endogenous Promotion Time," VfS Annual Conference 2020 (Virtual Conference): Gender Economics 224589, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jecsur:v:19:y:2005:i:1:p:91-111. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0950-0804 .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.