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Zero-determinant strategies in iterated multi-strategy games

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  • Jin-Li Guo

Abstract

Self-serving, rational agents sometimes cooperate to their mutual benefit. The two-player iterated prisoner's dilemma game is a model for including the emergence of cooperation. It is generally believed that there is no simple ultimatum strategy which a player can control the return of the other participants. The recent discovery of the powerful class of zero-determinant strategies in the iterated prisoner's dilemma dramatically expands our understanding of the classic game by uncovering strategies that provide a unilateral advantage to sentient players pitted against unwitting opponents. However, strategies in the prisoner's dilemma game are only two strategies. Are there these results for general multi-strategy games? To address this question, the paper develops a theory for zero-determinant strategies for multi-strategy games, with any number of strategies. The analytical results exhibit a similar yet different scenario to the case of two-strategy games. Zero-determinant strategies in iterated prisoner's dilemma can be seen as degenerate case of our results. The results are also applied to the snowdrift game, the hawk-dove game and the chicken game.

Suggested Citation

  • Jin-Li Guo, 2014. "Zero-determinant strategies in iterated multi-strategy games," Papers 1409.1786, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2014.
  • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:1409.1786
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Christoph Adami & Arend Hintze, 2013. "Evolutionary instability of zero-determinant strategies demonstrates that winning is not everything," Nature Communications, Nature, vol. 4(1), pages 1-8, October.
    2. Christian Hilbe & Torsten Röhl & Manfred Milinski, 2014. "Extortion subdues human players but is finally punished in the prisoner’s dilemma," Nature Communications, Nature, vol. 5(1), pages 1-6, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Masahiko Ueda & Toshiyuki Tanaka, 2020. "Linear algebraic structure of zero-determinant strategies in repeated games," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 15(4), pages 1-13, April.
    2. Masahiko Ueda, 2022. "Controlling Conditional Expectations by Zero-Determinant Strategies," SN Operations Research Forum, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 1-22, September.
    3. El-Salam, Salsabeel M. Abd & El-Seidy, Essam & Abdel-Malek, Amira R., 2023. "Evaluating zero-determinant strategies’ effects on cooperation and conflict resolution in repeated games," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 174(C).
    4. Taha, Mohammad A. & Ghoneim, Ayman, 2021. "Zero-determinant strategies in infinitely repeated three-player prisoner's dilemma game," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 152(C).

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