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The coordination of collective and individual solutions in risk-resistant scenarios

Author

Listed:
  • Jun Qian

    (Tsinghua University)

  • Tongda Zhang

    (Southern University of Science and Technology)

  • Xiao Sun

    (Tsinghua University)

  • Yueting Chai

    (Tsinghua University)

Abstract

Human societies are constantly coping with global risks. In the face of these risks, people typically have two options, that is, to respond together as a whole (collective solution) or to respond independently (individual solution). Based on these two solutions, individuals have a variety of behavioral strategies. On the other hand, various regulatory bodies supported by the population limit people’s choices and punish individuals who do not contribute to collective solutions. So with different risks, how do the two solutions, the various individual strategies, and the constraints from regulators affect the group’s response to risk? This paper proposes an extended public goods game model involving opportunists and the regulator to explore the effectiveness of collective and individual solutions against risks. The results show that requiring individuals to invest more in the collective solution reduces the group’ s success in resisting risk. To improve the group’s ability to resist risk, investment in individual solution should be at least no less than that in collective solution. The establishment fund and punishment intensity of the regulatory agency have no significant effect on the success of collective and individual solutions. This inspires us to contemplate the role and measures of various types of authorities in coping with global risks. Graphic Abstract

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  • Jun Qian & Tongda Zhang & Xiao Sun & Yueting Chai, 2023. "The coordination of collective and individual solutions in risk-resistant scenarios," The European Physical Journal B: Condensed Matter and Complex Systems, Springer;EDP Sciences, vol. 96(2), pages 1-15, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:eurphb:v:96:y:2023:i:2:d:10.1140_epjb_s10051-023-00487-1
    DOI: 10.1140/epjb/s10051-023-00487-1
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