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The Strategic Manipulation of Asymmetric Climate Conflicts

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  • Joungseok Park

Abstract

The decision-makers choose progressive or conservative actions towards climate change. A decision-maker from a country with greater damage from climate change is more likely to be progressive than a country with lesser damage. Climate scientists can manipulate this decision-making by sending publicly observed cheap-talk messages. The likelihood of both players choosing progressive action on climate change decreases if both players are “coordination” types and the scientist is conservative. The conservative scientist can cause this by sending skeptical messages that trigger a spiral of climate change skepticism. This reduces the welfare of both decision-makers. If both players are opportunistic types, a progressive scientist can send alarming messages that cause the decision-maker from the country with greater damage from climate change to be more progressive. This reduces his welfare but benefits the other decision-maker. I show that there does not exist any communication equilibrium for either kind of scientist, for any other combination of player types. Key Words: Climate Change; Climate Politics.

Suggested Citation

  • Joungseok Park, 2016. "The Strategic Manipulation of Asymmetric Climate Conflicts," Working Papers 16-21, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University.
    • Handle: RePEc:apl:wpaper:16-21
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    File URL: http://econ.appstate.edu/RePEc/pdf/wp1621.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    8. Joungseok Park, 2016. "Rational Skeptics: On the Strategic Communication of Scientific Data," Working Papers 16-19, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    climate change; climate politics.;

    JEL classification:

    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

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