The Dynamics of Costly Signaling
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Cited by:
- Patrick Kane & Kevin J S Zollman, 2015. "An Evolutionary Comparison of the Handicap Principle and Hybrid Equilibrium Theories of Signaling," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 10(9), pages 1-14, September.
- Simon M. Huttegger & Kevin J. S. Zollman, 2016. "The Robustness of Hybrid Equilibria in Costly Signaling Games," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 347-358, September.
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Keywords
game theory; evolutionary dynamics; signaling; costly signaling;All these keywords.
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