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Endogenous market segmentation for lemons

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  • Kyungmin Kim

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  • Kyungmin Kim, 2012. "Endogenous market segmentation for lemons," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 43(3), pages 562-576, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:randje:v:43:y:2012:i:3:p:562-576
    DOI: j.1756-2171.2012.00186.x
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Giuseppe Attanasi & Samuele Centorrino & Elena Manzoni, 2020. "Zero-Intelligence vs. Human Agents: An Experimental Analysis of the Efficiency of Double Auctions and Over-the-Counter Markets of Varying Sizes," Working Papers 05/2020, University of Verona, Department of Economics.
    2. Gary Biglaiser & Fei Li & Charles Murry & Yiyi Zhou, 2020. "Intermediaries and product quality in used car markets," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(3), pages 905-933, September.
    3. Lihui Lin, 2023. "Does risk aversion explain behavior in a lemon market?," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 75(2), pages 413-425, April.
    4. Lee, Jaesun & Shapiro, Dmitry, 2023. "Quality communication via cheap-talk messages in experimental auctions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 212(C), pages 74-107.
    5. Timothy Perri, 2016. "Does signalling solve the lemons problem?," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(4), pages 227-229, March.
    6. Dmitry A. Shapiro & Jaesun Lee, 2022. "Revealing Negative Information in Monopoly and Duopoly Settings: Experimental Analysis," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, vol. 38, pages 167-205.
    7. Matthew Backus & Tom Blake & Steven Tadelis, 2015. "Cheap Talk, Round Numbers, and the Economics of Negotiation," NBER Working Papers 21285, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Siegenthaler, Simon, 2017. "Meet the lemons: An experiment on how cheap-talk overcomes adverse selection in decentralized markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 147-161.
    9. Albrecht, James & Cai, Xiaoming & Gautier, Pieter A. & Vroman, Susan, 2024. "Competitive Search with Private Information: Can Price Signal Quality?," IZA Discussion Papers 17246, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    10. Zhifeng Cai & Feng Dong, 2021. "A Model of Secular Migration from Centralized to Decentralized Trade," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(1), pages 201-244, July.
    11. Giuseppe Attanasi & Samuele Centorrino & Elena Manzoni, 2021. "Zero‐intelligence versus human agents: An experimental analysis of the efficiency of Double Auctions and Over‐the‐Counter markets of varying sizes," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(5), pages 895-932, October.
    12. Derek Stacey, 2016. "Commitment And Costly Signaling In Decentralized Markets," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 57(4), pages 1507-1533, November.
    13. Derek Stacey, 2012. "Information, Commitment, and Separation in Illiquid Housing Markets," 2012 Meeting Papers 401, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    14. Dmitry Shapiro & Seung Huh, 2021. "Incentives of low‐quality sellers to disclose negative information," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(1), pages 81-99, February.
    15. Jun Aoyagi & Daisuke Adachi, 2018. "Economic Implications of Blockchain Platforms," Papers 1802.10117, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2018.
    16. Surajeet Chakravarty & Todd R. Kaplan & Luke Lindsay, 2020. "Increasing Employment Through the Partial Release of Information," Discussion Papers 2001, University of Exeter, Department of Economics, revised 2023.
    17. Horton, John J. & Johari, Ramesh & Kircher, Philipp, 2021. "Cheap Talk Messages for Market Design: Theory and Evidence from a Labor Market with Directed," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2021033, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    18. Liu, Ting & Ma, Ching-to Albert, 2024. "Equilibrium information in credence goods," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 84-101.
    19. Gersbach, Hans & Mamageishvili, Akaki & Tejada, Oriol, 2019. "Lemons and Peaches: A (Robust) Multi-stage Buying Mechanism with Multiple Applications," CEPR Discussion Papers 14063, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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