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Diversity and Empowerment in Organizations

Author

Listed:
  • Daniel Habermacher

    (Universidad de Los Andes)

  • Nicolás Riquelme

    (Universidad de Los Andes)

Abstract

We study how diversity and participatory decision-making affect organizational performance. Our model involves a manager who can acquire costly information to guide project selection, and a worker responsible for its implementation. We model diversity as heterogeneous beliefs between the organization’s members and participatory decision-making as how much the worker’s perspective influences project choice—related to notions of empowerment and inclusion. Our findings show that higher diversity enhances decision-making and implementation outcomes when the manager can access high-quality information and the worker is sufficiently empowered. When information acquisition is covert, the manager cannot signal her commitment to reducing disagreement, thus eliminating any benefits of increasing diversity. When communication is strategic, the associated credibility loss dilutes the manager’s benefits from acquiring information, but the conflict of interest decreases with information quality. Our results imply that the ‘business case for diversity’ requires complementary organizational processes that foster informational transparency and trust among members.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel Habermacher & Nicolás Riquelme, 2025. "Diversity and Empowerment in Organizations," Working Papers 352, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
  • Handle: RePEc:aoz:wpaper:352
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    File URL: https://rednie.eco.unc.edu.ar/files/DT/352.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Diversity; Worker Empowerment; Information Acquisition; Moral Hazard; Firm Performance.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • L25 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Performance
    • M54 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Labor Management

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