IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ant/wpaper/2000021.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Discrete choice models and optimal two-part tariffs in the presence of externalities: Optimal taxation of cars

Author

Listed:
  • DE BORGER, Bruno

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to analyse optimal two-part tariffs in the presence of externalities within the framework of a model of discrete choice. The prototype application of the model is optimal taxation of car ownership and car use to correct for external costs. The externality we consider is allowed to cause feedback effects on demand and ownership shares and, therefore, on tax revenues. It is found that only the feedback effect of the externality on ownership shares is important in determining the optimal tax structure. When external costs differ between car types, it is shown that the role of fixed taxes crucially depends on the available variable tax instruments; various restrictions on variable tax instruments are analysed. We also study the implications of heterogeneity and distributive concerns for the optimal taxation of externalities via user and ownership taxes. We identify the specific role of the distribution of ownership and of conditional demands as well as the distributive impact of the externality itself.

Suggested Citation

  • DE BORGER, Bruno, "undated". "Discrete choice models and optimal two-part tariffs in the presence of externalities: Optimal taxation of cars," Working Papers 2000021, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Business and Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ant:wpaper:2000021
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://repository.uantwerpen.be/docman/irua/4da536/515562a7.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Yew-Kwang Ng & Mendel Weisser, 1974. "Optimal Pricing with a Budget Constraint—The Case of the Two-part Tariff," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 41(3), pages 337-345.
    2. A. Lans Bovenberg & Frederick van der Ploeg, 2002. "Environmental Policy, Public Finance and the Labour Market in a Second-Best World," Chapters, in: Lawrence H. Goulder (ed.), Environmental Policy Making in Economies with Prior Tax Distortions, chapter 6, pages 112-153, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. Ian W. H. Parry & Antonio Bento, 2001. "Revenue Recycling and the Welfare Effects of Road Pricing," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 103(4), pages 645-671, December.
    4. Richard Schmalensee, 1981. "Monopolistic Two-Part Pricing Arrangements," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(2), pages 445-466, Autumn.
    5. Diamond, P. A., 1975. "A many-person Ramsey tax rule," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 335-342, November.
    6. Small, Kenneth A., 1983. "The incidence of congestion tolls on urban highways," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 90-111, January.
    7. S. Proost & D. van Regemorter, 2002. "The Double Dividend and the Role of Inequality Aversion and Macroeconomic Regimes," Chapters, in: Lawrence H. Goulder (ed.), Environmental Policy Making in Economies with Prior Tax Distortions, chapter 30, pages 596-608, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    8. Glazer, Amihai & Niskanen, Esko, 1992. "Parking fees and congestion," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 123-132, March.
    9. Small, Kenneth A & Rosen, Harvey S, 1981. "Applied Welfare Economics with Discrete Choice Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(1), pages 105-130, January.
    10. Glaister, Stephen & Lewis, Davis, 1978. "An integrated fares policy for transport in London," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 341-355, June.
    11. Kraus, Marvin, 1989. "The welfare gains from pricing road congestion using automatic vehicle identification and on-vehicle meters," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 261-281, May.
    12. Lave, Charles, 1994. "The demand curve under road pricing and the problem of political feasibility," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 83-91, March.
    13. A. Lans Bovenberg & Frederick van der Ploeg, 2002. "Environmental Policy, Public Finance and the Labour Market in a Second-Best World," Chapters, in: Lawrence H. Goulder (ed.), Environmental Policy Making in Economies with Prior Tax Distortions, chapter 6, pages 112-153, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    14. Arnott, Richard & de Palma, Andre & Lindsey, Robin, 1993. "A Structural Model of Peak-Period Congestion: A Traffic Bottleneck with Elastic Demand," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 161-179, March.
    15. Sharkey, William W. & Sibley, David S., 1993. "Optimal non-linear pricing with regulatory preference over customer type," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 197-229, February.
    16. De Borger, Bruno, 1997. "Public pricing of final and intermediate goods in the presence of externalities," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 765-781, December.
    17. De Borger, Bruno, 2000. "Optimal two-part tariffs in a model of discrete choice," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 127-150, April.
    18. Lave, Charles, 1994. "The Demand Curve Under Road Pricing and the Problem of Political Feasibility," University of California Transportation Center, Working Papers qt5165m7jr, University of California Transportation Center.
    19. Stephen C. Littlechild, 1975. "Two-Park Tariffs and Consumption Externalities," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 6(2), pages 661-670, Autumn.
    20. Martin S. Feldstein, 1972. "Equity and Efficiency in Public Sector Pricing: The Optimal Two-Part Tariff," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 86(2), pages 175-187.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. De Borger, Bruno, 2000. "Optimal two-part tariffs in a model of discrete choice," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 127-150, April.
    2. Inge Mayeres, 1999. "The Distributional Impacts of Policies for the Control of Transport Externalities.An Applied General Equilibrium Model," Working Papers 1999.8, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    3. De Borger, Bruno & Courcelle, Christophe & Swysen, Didier, 2004. "Optimal pricing of transport externalities in an international environment: some empirical results based on a numerical optimization model," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 163-201, March.
    4. De Borger, Bruno & Van Dender, Kurt, 2003. "Transport tax reform, commuting, and endogenous values of time," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 510-530, May.
    5. De Borger, Bruno & Mayeres, Inge, 2007. "Optimal taxation of car ownership, car use and public transport: Insights derived from a discrete choice numerical optimization model," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(5), pages 1177-1204, July.
    6. Sen, Akshaya Kumar & Tiwari, Geetam & Upadhyay, Vrajaindra, 2010. "Estimating marginal external costs of transport in Delhi," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 27-37, January.
    7. Hall, Jonathan D., 2018. "Pareto improvements from Lexus Lanes: The effects of pricing a portion of the lanes on congested highways," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 158(C), pages 113-125.
    8. DE BORGER, Bruno & MAYERES, Inge, "undated". "Taxation of car-ownership, car use and public transport: Insight derived from a discrete choice numerical optimisation model," Working Papers 2004021, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Business and Economics.
    9. María Angeles García Valiñas, 2004. "Eficiencia y equidad en el diseño de precios óptimos para bienes y servicios públicos," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 168(1), pages 95-119, march.
    10. Larsen, Morten Marott & Pilegaard, Ninette & Ommeren, Jos Van, 2008. "Congestion and residential moving behaviour," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(4), pages 378-387, July.
    11. Mayeres, Inge & Proost, Stef, 2001. "Marginal tax reform, externalities and income distribution," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 343-363, February.
    12. Edward Calthrop, 2001. "On Subsidising Auto-Commuting," CESifo Working Paper Series 566, CESifo.
    13. Ahlberg, Joakim, 2006. "Optimal Taxation of Intermediate Goods in the Presence of Externalities: A Survey Towards the Transport Sector," Working Papers 2006:3, Swedish National Road & Transport Research Institute (VTI).
    14. Sara Hsu & David Kiefer, 2005. "Perfect Price Discrimination is not So Perfect," Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, University of Utah 2005_04, University of Utah, Department of Economics.
    15. Lundholm, Michael, 2005. "Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Marginal Cost of Public Funds," Research Papers in Economics 2005:3, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.
    16. Viauroux, Christelle, 2007. "Structural estimation of congestion costs," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 1-25, January.
    17. Bas (B.) Jacobs & Rick (F.) van der Ploeg, 2017. "Should Pollution Taxes Be Targeted At Income Redistribution?," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 17-070/VI, Tinbergen Institute.
    18. Verhoef, Erik T., 1999. "Time, speeds, flows and densities in static models of road traffic congestion and congestion pricing," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 341-369, May.
    19. Chiroleu-Assouline, Mireille & Fodha, Mouez, 2006. "Double dividend hypothesis, golden rule and welfare distribution," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 323-335, May.
    20. Fernández, Esther & Pérez, Rafaela & Ruiz, Jesús, 2010. "Double dividend, dynamic Laffer effects and public abatement," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 656-665, May.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Optimal taxation; Two-part tariff; Externalities; Discrete choice;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • R48 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Transportation Economics - - - Government Pricing and Policy

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ant:wpaper:2000021. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Joeri Nys (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ftufsbe.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.