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Rethinking innovation policy in India: Amplifying spillovers through contracting-out

Author

Listed:
  • R. A. Mashelkar

    (Former DG, CSIR)

  • Ajay Shah

    (xKDR Forum)

  • Susan Thomas

    (xKDR Forum)

Abstract

At independence, India committed itself fully to foster, promote and sustain the creation of science and scientific research in all aspects. In this paper, we present first principles reasoning on the case for state action, and the optimal mechanisms for using taxpayer resources, to fulfill this commitment. We argue in favour of a reorientation of public spending on innovation: away from building vertical government organisations, and in favour of a contracting-out strategy. Such a strategy would induce knowledge and capabilities in the society, and through this, induce greater gains for the people of India. We present a preliminary sketch of the path to implementation.

Suggested Citation

  • R. A. Mashelkar & Ajay Shah & Susan Thomas, 2024. "Rethinking innovation policy in India: Amplifying spillovers through contracting-out," Working Papers 32, xKDR.
  • Handle: RePEc:anf:wpaper:32
    as

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    File URL: https://papers.xkdr.org/papers/MashelkarST2024_rethinking_indian_innov.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2024
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Philippe Aghion & Jean Tirole, 1994. "The Management of Innovation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 109(4), pages 1185-1209.
    2. Archibald, Robert B. & Finifter, David H., 2003. "Evaluating the NASA small business innovation research program: preliminary evidence of a trade-off between commercialization and basic research," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 605-619, April.
    3. Aneesha Chitgupi & Susan Thomas, 2023. "Learning by doing for public procurement," Working Papers 22, xKDR.
    4. David P. Baron & David Besanko, 1987. "Monitoring, Moral Hazard, Asymmetric Information, and Risk Sharing in Procurement Contracting," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(4), pages 509-532, Winter.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H51 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Health
    • H52 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Education
    • H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
    • I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy
    • O32 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
    • O38 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Government Policy

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