Quality Measurement and Contract Design: Lessons from the North American Sugarbeet Industry
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DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.201551
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- Brent Hueth & Tigran Melkonyan, 2004. "Quality Measurement and Contract Design: Lessons from the North American Sugarbeet Industry," Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d'agroeconomie, Canadian Agricultural Economics Society/Societe canadienne d'agroeconomie, vol. 52(2), pages 165-181, July.
References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Gregory McKee & Michael Boland & Alex Offerdahl, 2009.
"American Crystal Sugar Company: Making Ethanol from Sugar Beets?,"
Review of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 31(2), pages 383-392, June.
- Gregory McKee & Michael Boland & Alex Offerdahl, 2009. "American Crystal Sugar Company: Making Ethanol from Sugar Beets?," Review of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 31(2), pages 383-392.
- Brent Hueth & Philippe Marcoul & Roger G. Ginder, 2004.
"Cooperative Formation and Financial Contracting in Agricultural Markets,"
Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) Publications
03-wp349, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) at Iowa State University.
- Hueth, Brent & Marcoul, Philippe & Ginder, Roger G., 2005. "Cooperative Formation And Financial Contracting In Agricultural Markets," 2005 Annual meeting, July 24-27, Providence, RI 19324, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
- Jaenicke, Edward C. & Shields, Martin & Kelsey, Timothy W., 2007.
"Food Processors' Use of Contracts to Purchase Agricultural Inputs: Evidence from a Pennsylvania Survey,"
Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 36(2), pages 213-229, October.
- Jaenicke, Edward C. & Shields, Martin & Kelsey, Timothy W., 2007. "Food Processors’ Use of Contracts to Purchase Agricultural Inputs: Evidence from a Pennsylvania Survey," Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association, vol. 36(2), pages 1-17, October.
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Keywords
Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety; Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods;All these keywords.
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