IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ags/uerstb/157045.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Optimal Cost-Sharing Programs to Reduce Agricultural Pollution

Author

Listed:
  • Shoemaker, Robbin A.
  • Malik, Arun S.

Abstract

Pollution from agriculture depends on the agricultural practices or technologies farmers use. Policy instruments, such as government cost-sharing programs, can reduce the costs of adopting less-polluting practices. This report examines the problem of designing economically efficient cost-sbaring programs. Farmers' decisions to adopt less-polluting technologies are based on the profitability of their farms' adjusting technology, compared with new technologies. A benchmark solution to the pollution problem serves as a reference against which to compare the optimal cost-Sharing policy with imperfect targeting of land. The optimal input subsidy scheme depends on the pollution being managed, costs associated with the participation constraint, and the social cost of public funds.

Suggested Citation

  • Shoemaker, Robbin A. & Malik, Arun S., 1993. "Optimal Cost-Sharing Programs to Reduce Agricultural Pollution," Technical Bulletins 157045, United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:uerstb:157045
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.157045
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/157045/files/tb1820.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/157045/files/tb1820.pdf?subformat=pdfa
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.22004/ag.econ.157045?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Osteen, Craig D. & Szmedra, Philip I., 1989. "Agricultural Pesticide Use Trends and Policy Issues," Agricultural Economic Reports 308081, United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.
    2. A. Mitchell Polinsky, 1979. "Notes on the Symmetry of Taxes and Subsidies in Pollution Control," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 12(1), pages 75-83, February.
    3. James S. Shortle & James W. Dunn, 1986. "The Relative Efficiency of Agricultural Source Water Pollution Control Policies," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 68(3), pages 668-677.
    4. Negri, Donald H. & Hanchar, John J., 1989. "Water Conservation through Irrigation Technology," Agricultural Information Bulletins 309514, United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Lichtenberg, Erik & Smith-Ramirez, Ricardo, 2003. "Cost Sharing, Transaction Costs, And Conservation," 2003 Annual meeting, July 27-30, Montreal, Canada 22141, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    2. Baerenklau, Kenneth A., 2002. "Green Payment Programs For Nonpoint Source Pollution Control: How Important Is Targeting For Cost-Effectiveness?," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 27(2), pages 1-14, December.
    3. Heimlich, Ralph E. & Claassen, Roger, 1998. "Agricultural Conservation Policy At A Crossroads," Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association, vol. 27(1), pages 1-13, April.
    4. Gregory Amacher & Peter Feather, 1997. "Testing producer perceptions of jointly beneficial best management practices for improved water quality," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 29(2), pages 153-159.
    5. Lichtenberg, Erik, 2002. "Agriculture and the environment," Handbook of Agricultural Economics, in: B. L. Gardner & G. C. Rausser (ed.), Handbook of Agricultural Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 23, pages 1249-1313, Elsevier.
    6. Andrea Cattaneo, 2003. "The Pursuit of Efficiency and Its Unintended Consequences: Contract Withdrawals in the Environmental Quality Incentives Program," Review of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 25(2), pages 449-469.
    7. Cattaneo, Andrea, 2001. "Environmental Quality Incentives Program: Why Are So Many Contracts Being Cancelled?," 2001 Annual meeting, August 5-8, Chicago, IL 20597, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    8. Ricardo Smith, 2006. "Measuring the Effects of Working-Land Conservation Programs on Adoption of Soil-Erosion Reducing Practices and Permanent Vegetative Cover," Working Papers DTE 369, CIDE, División de Economía.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Shumway, C. Richard & Chesser, Rayanne R., 1994. "Pesticide Tax, Cropping Patterns, and Water Quality in South Central Texas," Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 26(1), pages 224-240, July.
    2. Carsten Helm & Mathias Mier, 2020. "Steering the Energy Transition in a World of Intermittent Electricity Supply: Optimal Subsidies and Taxes for Renewables Storage," ifo Working Paper Series 330, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich.
    3. Kozloff, Keith, 1990. "An Evaluation Of Options For Micro-Targeting Acquisition Of Cropping Rights To Reduce Nonpoint Source Water Pollution," Staff Papers 13610, University of Minnesota, Department of Applied Economics.
    4. Batie, Sandra S. & Arcenas, Agustin, 1998. "Toward Agricultural Environmental Management: Applying Lessons From Corporate Environmental Management," Staff Paper Series 11807, Michigan State University, Department of Agricultural, Food, and Resource Economics.
    5. Crutchfield, Stephen R. & Brazee, Richard J., 1990. "An Integrated Model of Surface and Ground Water Quality," 1990 Annual meeting, August 5-8, Vancouver, Canada 271011, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    6. Coxhead, Ian A. & Demeke, Bayou, 2006. "Modeling Spatially Differentiated Environmental Policy in a Philippine Watershed: Tradeoffs between Environmental Protection and Poverty Reduction," 2006 Annual meeting, July 23-26, Long Beach, CA 21115, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    7. Bystrom, Olof & Andersson, Hans & Gren, Ing-Marie, 2000. "Economic criteria for using wetlands as nitrogen sinks under uncertainty," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 35-45, October.
    8. Karp, Larry, 1998. "Nonpoint Source Pollution Taxes and Excessive Tax Burden," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt4z62b52k, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
    9. Bystrom, Olof & Bromley, Daniel W., 1998. "Contracting For Nonpoint-Source Pollution Abatement," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 23(1), pages 1-19, July.
    10. Helm, Carsten & Mier, Mathias, 2021. "Steering the energy transition in a world of intermittent electricity supply: Optimal subsidies and taxes for renewables and storage," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
    11. COCHARD François & ROZAN Anne & SPAETER Sandrine, 2006. "Prevention and Compensation of Muddy Flows: Some Economic Insights," LERNA Working Papers 06.24.217, LERNA, University of Toulouse.
    12. Brady, Mark, 2003. "The relative cost-efficiency of arable nitrogen management in Sweden," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 53-70, November.
    13. Fleming, R. A. & Adams, R. M., 1997. "The Importance of Site-Specific Information in the Design of Policies to Control Pollution," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 347-358, July.
    14. Peifang Yang & Daniel T. Kaffine, 2016. "Community-Based Tradable Permits for Localized Pollution," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 65(4), pages 773-788, December.
    15. Mitchell, Paul David, 1999. "The theory and practice of green insurance: insurance to encourage the adoption of corn rootworm IPM," ISU General Staff Papers 1999010108000013154, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    16. Horan, Richard D. & Shortle, James S. & Abler, David G., 1998. "Ambient Taxes When Polluters Have Multiple Choices," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 186-199, September.
    17. Pierre Rainelli & Dominique Vermersch, 2000. "Gestion foncière des excédents azotés et marché implicite de droits à polluer : application aux élevages intensifs," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 143(2), pages 91-100.
    18. Gordon, Simon, 2003. "Economic Instruments For Nonpoint Source Water Pollution: Options For The Swan-Canning River System," 2003 Conference (47th), February 12-14, 2003, Fremantle, Australia 57873, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
    19. Pierre Rainelli & Dominique Vermersch, 1997. "Les pollutions d'origine agricole et l'application du principe pollueur-payeur," Working Papers hal-01594277, HAL.
    20. Carriker, Gordon L., 1993. "Factor Input Demand Subject to Economic and Environmental Risk: The Case of Nitrogen Fertilizer in Corn Production," Staff Papers 118154, Kansas State University, Department of Agricultural Economics.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:uerstb:157045. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: AgEcon Search (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ersgvus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.