IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ags/jlaare/31117.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Green Payment Programs For Nonpoint Source Pollution Control: How Important Is Targeting For Cost-Effectiveness?

Author

Listed:
  • Baerenklau, Kenneth A.

Abstract

Mechanism design theory is used to examine the case of a cost-minimizing regulator who uses input-reduction subsidies to meet an exogenously imposed ambient standard for nonpoint source pollution. A general result claimed for a welfare-maximizing equilibrium. Numerical results suggest the ability to directly target contracts reduces costs significantly for the regulator. But in the absence of this ability, indirect targeting reduces costs only slightly.

Suggested Citation

  • Baerenklau, Kenneth A., 2002. "Green Payment Programs For Nonpoint Source Pollution Control: How Important Is Targeting For Cost-Effectiveness?," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 27(2), pages 1-14, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:jlaare:31117
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.31117
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/31117/files/27020406.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.22004/ag.econ.31117?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Wu, JunJie & Babcock, Bruce A., 1995. "Optimal Design Of A Voluntary Green Payment Program Under Asymmetric Information," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 20(2), pages 1-12, December.
    2. Shortle, James S., 1987. "Allocative Implications Of Comparisons Between The Marginal Costs Of Point And Nonpoint Source Pollution Abatement," Northeastern Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association, vol. 16(1), pages 1-7, April.
    3. Segerson, Kathleen, 1988. "Uncertainty and incentives for nonpoint pollution control," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 87-98, March.
    4. Tietenberg, Thomas H, 1974. "On Taxation and the Control of Externalities: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(3), pages 462-466, June.
    5. Shoemaker, Robbin A. & Malik, Arun S., 1993. "Optimal Cost-Sharing Programs to Reduce Agricultural Pollution," Technical Bulletins 157045, United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.
    6. Xepapadeas, A. P., 1991. "Environmental policy under imperfect information: Incentives and moral hazard," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 113-126, March.
    7. Arun S. Malik & David Letson & Stephen R. Crutchfield, 1993. "Point/Nonpoint Source Trading of Pollution Abatement: Choosing the Right Trading Ratio," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 75(4), pages 959-967.
    8. Smith, Rodney B.W. & Tomasi, Theodore D., 1995. "Transaction Costs And Agricultural Nonpoint-Source Water Pollution Control Policies," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 20(2), pages 1-14, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Elofsson, Katarina, 2011. "Contracting Nitrogen Abatement in the Baltic Proper Watershed Under the Risk of Climate Change," 2011 International Congress, August 30-September 2, 2011, Zurich, Switzerland 114344, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
    2. Howitt, Richard E. & Kaplan, Jonathan D. & Johnson, Michael L. & Viers, Joshua H., 2004. "Managing Water Temperature Tmdls Under Economic And Environmental Uncertainty," 2004 Annual meeting, August 1-4, Denver, CO 20182, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Lichtenberg, Erik, 2002. "Agriculture and the environment," Handbook of Agricultural Economics, in: B. L. Gardner & G. C. Rausser (ed.), Handbook of Agricultural Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 23, pages 1249-1313, Elsevier.
    2. Segerson, Kathleen & Wu, JunJie, 2006. "Nonpoint pollution control: Inducing first-best outcomes through the use of threats," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 165-184, March.
    3. Lars Hansen, 2002. "Regulation of Non-Point Emissions – A Variance Based Mechanism," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 21(4), pages 303-316, April.
    4. Kampas, Athanasios, 2001. "Identifying Common Fallacies in the Choice of Environmental Taxes for Agricultural Pollution Control: The Absence of Transaction Costs and the Normality of Agricultural Pollutants," Agricultural Economics Review, Greek Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 2(2), pages 1-15, August.
    5. Tun Lin & Timo Goeschl, 2004. "Biodiversity Conservation on Private Lands: Information Problems and Regulatory Choices," Working Papers 2004.55, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    6. Alfons Weersink & John R. Livernois & Jason F. Shogren & James S. Shortle, 1998. "Economic Instruments and Environmental Policy in Agriculture," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 24(3), pages 309-327, September.
    7. Greenhalgh, Suzie & Selman, Mindy, 2012. "Comparing Water Quality Trading Programs: What Lessons Are There To Learn?," Journal of Regional Analysis and Policy, Mid-Continent Regional Science Association, vol. 42(2), pages 1-22.
    8. Letson, David & Crutchfield, Stephen & Malik, Arun, 1993. "Point-Nonpoint Source Trading for Managing Agricultural Pollutant Loadings: Prospects for Coastal Watersheds," Agricultural Economic Reports 308279, United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.
    9. Karen Fisher-Vanden & Sheila Olmstead, 2013. "Moving Pollution Trading from Air to Water: Potential, Problems, and Prognosis," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 27(1), pages 147-172, Winter.
    10. Sheila M. Olmstead, 2010. "The Economics of Water Quality," Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 4(1), pages 44-62, Winter.
    11. Huennemeyer, Anne-Juliane & Rollins, Kimberly S., 2001. "Private Resource Management And Public Trust: Optimal Resource Conservation Contracts Under Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 34141, University of Guelph, Department of Food, Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    12. Johansson, Robert C., 2002. "Watershed Nutrient Trading Under Asymmetric Information," Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association, vol. 31(2), pages 1-13, October.
    13. James Shortle & Richard D. Horan, 2013. "Policy Instruments for Water Quality Protection," Annual Review of Resource Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 5(1), pages 111-138, June.
    14. Frans P. Vries & Nick Hanley, 2016. "Incentive-Based Policy Design for Pollution Control and Biodiversity Conservation: A Review," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 63(4), pages 687-702, April.
    15. Yiridoe, Emmanuel K. & Weersink, Alfons, 1997. "A review and evaluation of agroecosystem health analysis: The role of economics," Agricultural Systems, Elsevier, vol. 55(4), pages 601-626, December.
    16. Espínola-Arredondo, Ana & Muñoz-García, Félix, 2013. "When does environmental regulation facilitate entry-deterring practices," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 133-152.
    17. Khanna, Madhu & Zilberman, David, 1997. "Incentives, precision technology and environmental protection," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 25-43, October.
    18. Carmen Arguedas & Daan Soest, 2011. "Optimal Conservation Programs, Asymmetric Information and the Role of Fixed Costs," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 50(2), pages 305-323, October.
    19. Millock, Katrin & Xabadia, Angels & Zilberman, David, 2012. "Policy for the adoption of new environmental monitoring technologies to manage stock externalities," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 102-116.
    20. Francisco Alpízar & Till Requate & Albert Schram, 2004. "Collective versus Random Fining: An Experimental Study on Controlling Ambient Pollution," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 29(2), pages 231-252, October.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Environmental Economics and Policy;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:jlaare:31117. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: AgEcon Search (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/waeaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.