IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ags/spaawp/126945.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Mergers, concurrent marketing mechanisms and the performance of sequential auctions

Author

Listed:
  • Jeddy, Mohamed
  • Larue, Bruno

Abstract

We analyze the effects of mergers and the introduction of concurrent marketing mechanisms on the seller’s revenue, price trend and efficiency in sequential auctions under complete information with asymmetric bidders. First, we provide conditions for bidders to be strategic when the number of objects is less or greater than the number of bidders as this impacts upon the set of possible mergers. Second, we show that mergers may simultaneously increase the seller’s revenue and improve efficiency. Third, we show that having a marketing mechanism working alongside the auction can increase or decrease the average auction price. We use weekly data about Quebec’s daily hog auction to ascertain the effects of a merger and of changes in the weights of concurrent marketing mechanisms on daily auction prices. Our empirical analysis relies on an endogenous structural change test which detected three breaks corresponding to: i) the introduction of a new concurrent mechanism, ii) a joint-venture partnership of the two largest hog processing firms and iii) an announcement by Canada’s Competition Bureau authorizing the full merger of the same two firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Jeddy, Mohamed & Larue, Bruno, 2012. "Mergers, concurrent marketing mechanisms and the performance of sequential auctions," Working Papers 126945, Structure and Performance of Agriculture and Agri-products Industry (SPAA).
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:spaawp:126945
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.126945
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/126945/files/Merger_Auctions_02_2012.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.22004/ag.econ.126945?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gale, Ian L & Hausch, Donald B & Stegeman, Mark, 2000. "Sequential Procurement with Subcontracting," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(4), pages 989-1020, November.
    2. Kerekes, Monika, 2007. "Analyzing patterns of economic growth: a production frontier approach," Discussion Papers 2007/15, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
    3. Farrell, Joseph & Shapiro, Carl, 1990. "Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 107-126, March.
    4. Waehrer, Keith & Perry, Martin K, 2003. "The Effects of Mergers in Open-Auction Markets," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(2), pages 287-304, Summer.
    5. Bulow, Jeremy & Klemperer, Paul, 1996. "Auctions versus Negotiations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(1), pages 180-194, March.
    6. Steven Tschantz & Philip Crooke & Luke Froeb, 2000. "Mergers in Sealed versus Oral Auctions," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 7(2), pages 201-212.
    7. Huck, Steffen & Konrad, Kai A. & Müller, Wieland, 2001. "Profitable horizontal mergers without cost advantages: The role of internal organization, information, and market structure," Discussion Papers, various Research Units FS IV 01-05, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    8. J. Jouini & M. Boutahar, 2003. "Structural breaks in the U.S. inflation process: a further investigation," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 10(15), pages 985-988.
    9. repec:bla:econom:v:71:y:2004:i:284:p:575-587 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Gale, Ian L. & Stegeman, Mark, 2001. "Sequential Auctions of Endogenously Valued Objects," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 74-103, July.
    11. Rodriguez Gustavo E, 2009. "Sequential Auctions with Multi-Unit Demands," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-35, December.
    12. Yao, Yi-Ching, 1988. "Estimating the number of change-points via Schwarz' criterion," Statistics & Probability Letters, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 181-189, February.
    13. Mohamed Jeddy & Bruno Larue, 2012. "Multiplicity of Equilibria in Multi-Unit Demand Sequential Auctions under Complete Information," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(1), pages 456-465.
    14. Ajeyo Banerjee & E. Woodrow Eckard, 1998. "Are Mega-Mergers Anticompetitive? Evidence from the First Great Merger Wave," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(4), pages 803-827, Winter.
    15. Mohamed Jeddy & Bruno Larue & Jean-philippe Gervais, 2010. "Allocations and Price Trends in Sequential Auctions under Complete Information with Symmetric Bidders," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 30(1), pages 429-436.
    16. Krishna, Kala, 1993. "Auctions with Endogenous Valuations: The Persistence of Monopoly Revisited," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 147-160, March.
    17. Mohamed Safouane Ben Aissa & Jamel Jouini, 2003. "Structural breaks in the US inflation process," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 10(10), pages 633-636.
    18. B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1986. "Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 101(1), pages 1-31.
    19. Stephen W. Salant & Sheldon Switzer & Robert J. Reynolds, 1983. "Losses From Horizontal Merger: The Effects of an Exogenous Change in Industry Structure on Cournot-Nash Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(2), pages 185-199.
    20. Corbae,Dean & Durlauf,Steven N. & Hansen,Bruce E. (ed.), 2006. "Econometric Theory and Practice," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521807234, November.
    21. Mohamed Safouane Ben Aissa & Mohamed Boutahar & Jamel Jouini, 2004. "Bai and Perron's and spectral density methods for structural change detection in the US inflation process," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(2), pages 109-115.
    22. Thomas, Charles J., 2004. "The competitive effects of mergers between asymmetric firms," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(5), pages 679-692, May.
    23. Thomas, Charles J., 2011. "Vertical mergers in procurement markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 200-209, March.
    24. Katzman, Brett, 1999. "A Two Stage Sequential Auction with Multi-Unit Demands," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 77-99, May.
    25. Bruno Larue & Jean-Philippe Gervais & Harvey E. Lapan, 2004. "Low-Price Low-Capacity Traps and Government Intervention in the Québec Hog Market," Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d'agroeconomie, Canadian Agricultural Economics Society/Societe canadienne d'agroeconomie, vol. 52(3), pages 237-256, November.
    26. Mailath, George J. & Zemsky, Peter, 1991. "Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 467-486, November.
    27. Prodan, Ruxandra, 2008. "Potential Pitfalls in Determining Multiple Structural Changes With an Application to Purchasing Power Parity," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, American Statistical Association, vol. 26, pages 50-65, January.
    28. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:30:y:2010:i:1:p:429-436 is not listed on IDEAS
    29. Kala Krishna, 1999. "Auctions with endogenous valuations: the snowball effect revisited," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 13(2), pages 377-391.
    30. Jushan Bai & Pierre Perron, 2003. "Computation and analysis of multiple structural change models," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 18(1), pages 1-22.
    31. Steven Heubeck & Donald J. Smythe & Jingang Zhao, 2006. "A Note on the Welfare Effects of Horizontal Mergers in Asymmetric Linear Oligopolies," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 7(1), pages 29-47, May.
    32. Daughety, Andrew F, 1990. "Beneficial Concentration," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(5), pages 1231-1237, December.
    33. Dalkir, Serdar & Logan, John W. & Masson, Robert T., 2000. "Mergers in symmetric and asymmetric noncooperative auction markets: the effects on prices and efficiency," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 383-413, April.
    34. Raymond Deneckere & Carl Davidson, 1985. "Incentives to Form Coalitions with Bertrand Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(4), pages 473-486, Winter.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Bruno Larue & Sébastien Pouliot & Mohamed Jeddy, 2016. "On the Number and Heterogeneity of Bidders in Livestock Auctions," Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d'agroeconomie, Canadian Agricultural Economics Society/Societe canadienne d'agroeconomie, vol. 64(2), pages 289-310, June.
    2. Bruno Larue & Mohamed Jeddy & Sébastien Pouliot, 2013. "On the Number of Bidders and Auction Performance: when More Means Less," Cahiers de recherche CREATE 2013-4, CREATE.
    3. Maarten Janssen & Vladimir Karamychev, 2013. "Mergers in Bidding Markets," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 13-012/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
    4. John S. Heywood & Matthew McGinty, 2008. "Leading and Merging: Convex Costs, Stackelberg, and the Merger Paradox," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 74(3), pages 879-893, January.
    5. Sergio Currarini & Marco A. Marini, 2015. "Coalitional Approaches to Collusive Agreements in Oligopoly Games," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 83(3), pages 253-287, June.
    6. Oliver Budzinski & Arndt Christiansen, 2007. "The Oracle/PeopleSoft Case: Unilateral Effects, Simulation Models and Econometrics in Contemporary Merger Control," Marburg Working Papers on Economics 200702, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    7. repec:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2015-011 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Charles J. Thomas, 2021. "Profitable Horizontal Mergers Without Efficiencies Can Increase Consumer Surplus," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(3), pages 730-741, September.
    9. Cosnita-Langlais, Andreea, 2012. "Horizontal market concentration: Theoretical insights from spatial models," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 22-32.
    10. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:12:y:2007:i:12:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Essahbi Essaadi & Mohamed Boutahar, 2010. "A Measure of Variability in Comovement for Economic Variables: a Time-Varying Coherence Function Approach," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 30(2), pages 1054-1070.
    12. Thomas Giebe & Miyu Lee, 2020. "Competitors in merger control: Shall they be merely heard or also listened to?," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 49(3), pages 431-453, June.
    13. Strikholm, Birgit, 2006. "Determining the number of breaks in a piecewise linear regression model," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 648, Stockholm School of Economics.
    14. BOCCARD, Nicolas, 2009. "On efficiency, concentration and welfare," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2009040, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    15. Walter Ferrarese, 2020. "When Multiple Merged Entities Lead in Stackelberg Oligopolies," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 56(1), pages 131-142, February.
    16. Jouini, Jamel & Boutahar, Mohamed, 2005. "Evidence on structural changes in U.S. time series," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 391-422, May.
    17. Huck, Steffen & Konrad, Kai A. & Müller, Wieland, 2000. "Profitable horizontal mergers: A market structure-oriented view," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 2000,27, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
    18. Chen, Jiawei, 2009. "The effects of mergers with dynamic capacity accumulation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 92-109, January.
    19. Nathan H. Miller & Gloria Sheu, 2021. "Quantitative Methods for Evaluating the Unilateral Effects of Mergers," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 58(1), pages 143-177, February.
    20. Lommerud, Kjell Erik & Sorgard, Lars, 1997. "Merger and product range rivalry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 21-42, November.
    21. Inderst, Roman & Wey, Christian, 2003. "Bargaining, Mergers, and Technology Choice in Bilaterally Oligopolistic Industries," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(1), pages 1-19, Spring.
    22. Amir, Rabah & Diamantoudi, Effrosyni & Xue, Licun, 2009. "Merger performance under uncertain efficiency gains," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 264-273, March.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Industrial Organization; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Livestock Production/Industries;
    All these keywords.

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:spaawp:126945. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: AgEcon Search (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://servsas.fsaa.ulaval.ca/index.php?id=12482&L=1 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.