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Allocations and Price Trends in Sequential Auctions under Complete Information with Symmetric Bidders

Author

Listed:
  • Mohamed Jeddy

    (CREA, Laval University)

  • Bruno Larue

    (CREA, Laval University)

  • Jean-philippe Gervais

    (dept. of agricultural and resource economics, North Carolina State U.)

Abstract

We analyze sequential second-price auctions under complete information involving two or more bidders with similar decreasing marginal valuations. Krishna (1999) designed a 2-bidder numerical example to show the existence of two symmetric equilibria characterized by an asymmetric allocation and weakly declining prices. We generalize Krishna's insights by showing that symmetric (asymmetric) allocations imply constant (weakly declining) price patterns and we derive the necessary conditions supporting symmetric allocations. The conditions become increasingly restrictive as the number of object increases.

Suggested Citation

  • Mohamed Jeddy & Bruno Larue & Jean-philippe Gervais, 2010. "Allocations and Price Trends in Sequential Auctions under Complete Information with Symmetric Bidders," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 30(1), pages 429-436.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-09-00794
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kala Krishna, 1999. "Auctions with endogenous valuations: the snowball effect revisited," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 13(2), pages 377-391.
    2. Katzman, Brett, 1999. "A Two Stage Sequential Auction with Multi-Unit Demands," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 77-99, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bruno Larue & Mohamed Jeddy & Sébastien Pouliot, 2013. "On the Number of Bidders and Auction Performance: when More Means Less," Cahiers de recherche CREATE 2013-4, CREATE.
    2. Bruno Larue & Sébastien Pouliot & Mohamed Jeddy, 2016. "On the Number and Heterogeneity of Bidders in Livestock Auctions," Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d'agroeconomie, Canadian Agricultural Economics Society/Societe canadienne d'agroeconomie, vol. 64(2), pages 289-310, June.
    3. Jeddy, Mohamed & Larue, Bruno, 2012. "Mergers, concurrent marketing mechanisms and the performance of sequential auctions," Working Papers 126945, Structure and Performance of Agriculture and Agri-products Industry (SPAA).
    4. Mohamed Jeddy & Bruno Larue, 2012. "Multiplicity of Equilibria in Multi-Unit Demand Sequential Auctions under Complete Information," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(1), pages 456-465.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    auctions; complete information; price trends; allocations;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design

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