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Fishery Management Games: How to reduce effort and admit new members

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  • Do, Kim Hang Pham
  • Folmer, Henk
  • Norde, Henk

Abstract

This paper addresses the two main problems that Regional Fishery Management Organizations face. First, how to induce independent nations to reduce their fishing efforts from the competitive equilibrium to prevent the fish stock from extinction or to increase profits. We argue that adjustment from the Nash equilibrium to a state of sustainable yield can be achieved by means of the proportional rule without harming any of the countries involved. Next we propose the population monotonic allocation scheme as management rule for the second problem: the division of profits within an

Suggested Citation

  • Do, Kim Hang Pham & Folmer, Henk & Norde, Henk, 2006. "Fishery Management Games: How to reduce effort and admit new members," 2006 Conference, August 24-25, 2006, Nelson, New Zealand 31964, New Zealand Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:nzasin:31964
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.31964
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Norde, Henk & Pham Do, Kim Hang & Tijs, Stef, 2002. "Oligopoly games with and without transferable technologies," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 187-207, March.
    2. Nick Hanley & Henk Folmer (ed.), 1998. "Game Theory and the Environment," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1083.
    3. Norde, H.W. & Pham Do, K.H. & Tijs, S.H., 2002. "Oligopoly games with and without transferable technologies," Other publications TiSEM 0bc5059e-f4f3-42cd-a517-d, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    4. Hannesson, Rognvaldur, 1997. "Fishing as a Supergame," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 309-322, March.
    5. Robert W. Mckelvey & Leif K. Sandal & Stein I. Steinshamn, 2002. "Fish Wars On The High Seas: A Straddling Stock Competition Model," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 4(01), pages 53-69.
    6. Henk Folmer & H. L. Gabel (ed.), 2000. "Principles of Environmental and Resource Economics," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1605.
    7. Jeroen C.J.M. van den Bergh (ed.), 1999. "Handbook of Environmental and Resource Economics," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 801.
    8. Sprumont, Yves, 1990. "Population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 378-394, December.
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    Resource /Energy Economics and Policy;

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