IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ags/iefi07/6587.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Private Innovation and Public Innovation: Who Leads and Who Follows?

Author

Listed:
  • Arfini, Filippo
  • Cernicchiaro, Sabrina
  • Mancini, Maria Cecilia

Abstract

This paper examines two models of interaction between private and public institutions in respect to the process of innovation. While private firms adopt proactive strategies and public institutions follow it is considered that, under certain conditions, public institutions are the innovator and private firms are the followers. The first part of the research is theoretical and formulates the two models and their implications. The second part presents a case study of Italian products which have Animal Welfare (AW) attributes, where production follows the second relationship model. The case study shows that AW friendly products are the result of EU legislation, which obliges the industry to adapt production, organisation, publicity, communication and promotion. This is the inverse of the traditional relationship where private firms take the initiative.

Suggested Citation

  • Arfini, Filippo & Cernicchiaro, Sabrina & Mancini, Maria Cecilia, 2007. "Private Innovation and Public Innovation: Who Leads and Who Follows?," 2007 1st Forum, February 15-17, 2007, Innsbruck, Austria 6587, International European Forum on System Dynamics and Innovation in Food Networks.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:iefi07:6587
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.6587
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/6587/files/sp08ar01.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.22004/ag.econ.6587?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Darby, Michael R & Karni, Edi, 1973. "Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(1), pages 67-88, April.
    2. Winand Emons, 1997. "Credence Goods and Fraudelent Experts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(1), pages 107-119, Spring.
    3. Falvey, Rodney E, 1989. "Trade, Quality Reputations and Commercial Policy," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 30(3), pages 607-622, August.
    4. Marie-Laure Allain & Claire Chambolle, 2003. "Approches théoriques des rapports de force entre producteurs et distributeurs," Économie rurale, Programme National Persée, vol. 277(1), pages 183-191.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Auriol, Emmanuelle & Schilizzi, Steven G.M., 2015. "Quality signaling through certification in developing countries," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 105-121.
    2. Pim Heijnen, 2013. "Informative advertising by an environmental group," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 108(3), pages 249-272, April.
    3. Bester, Helmut & Ouyang, Yaofu, 2018. "Optimal procurement of a credence good under limited liability," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 96-129.
    4. Tat Y. Chan & Jia Li & Lamar Pierce, 2014. "Learning from Peers: Knowledge Transfer and Sales Force Productivity Growth," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 33(4), pages 463-484, July.
    5. David Bardey & Denis Gromb & David Martimort & Jérôme Pouyet, 2020. "Controlling Sellers Who Provide Advice: Regulation and Competition," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(3), pages 409-444, September.
    6. Yongmin Chen & Jianpei Li & Jin Zhang, 2022. "Efficient Liability In Expert Markets," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 63(4), pages 1717-1744, November.
    7. Liangfei Qiu & Arunima Chhikara & Asoo Vakharia, 2021. "Multidimensional Observational Learning in Social Networks: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 32(3), pages 876-894, September.
    8. Kick, Markus, 2015. "The Price Premium Induced by Branding: A Health Care Case Study," EconStor Preprints 182504, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    9. Giovanni Anania & Rosanna Nisticò, 2004. "Public Regulation as a Substitute for Trust in Quality Food Markets: What if the Trust Substitute cannot be Fully Trusted?," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 160(4), pages 681-701, December.
    10. Rudolf Kerschbamer & Matthias Sutter & Uwe Dulleck, 2009. "The Impact of Distributional Preferences on (Experimental) Markets for Expert Services," Working Papers 2009-28, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
    11. Robert B. Ekelund & Mark Thornton, 2019. "Extreme Credence and Imaginary Goods," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 47(3), pages 361-371, September.
    12. Momsen, Katharina, 2021. "Recommendations in credence goods markets with horizontal product differentiation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 19-38.
    13. Joachim Heinzel, 2019. "Credence Goods Markets with Fair and Opportunistic Experts," Working Papers CIE 119, Paderborn University, CIE Center for International Economics.
    14. Sergey Belev & Olga Boldareva & Ilya Sokolov & Anna Zolotareva, 2013. "Features of the Public Procurements of Innovation Products in Russian and the World," Published Papers 166, Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy, revised 2013.
    15. Ben Greiner & Le Zhang & Chengxiang Tang, 2017. "Separation of prescription and treatment in health care markets: A laboratory experiment," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(S3), pages 21-35, December.
    16. Lamar Pierce & Michael W. Toffel, 2013. "The Role of Organizational Scope and Governance in Strengthening Private Monitoring," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 24(5), pages 1558-1584, October.
    17. Fang Liu & Alexander Rasch & Marco A. Schwarz & Christian Waibel, 2020. "The role of diagnostic ability in markets for expert services," Working Papers 2020-07, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
    18. McCluskey, Jill J., 2000. "A Game Theoretic Approach to Organic Foods: An Analysis of Asymmetric Information and Policy," Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 29(1), pages 1-9, April.
    19. repec:hal:pseose:hal-00976890 is not listed on IDEAS
    20. Wright, Melissa A. & Beatty, Timothy K.M. & Chouinard, Hayley H., 2020. "Do firms leverage the FDA nutrient label rounding rules to generate favorable nutrition fact panels or health claims?," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 91(C).
    21. Patrick Bolton & Xavier Freixas & Joel Shapiro, 2004. "Conflicts of Interest, Information Provision and Competition in Banking," Working Papers 130, Barcelona School of Economics.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:iefi07:6587. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: AgEcon Search (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ilbonde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.