Agency and strategic contracts: Theory and evidence from R&D agreements in the pharmaceutical industry
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DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.06.007
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More about this item
Keywords
Agency; Entry threat; Strategic right; Termination;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
- L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures
- O30 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - General
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