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Coalition Development In The Agricultural Marketing System

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  • Puaha, Hubertus
  • Tilley, Daniel S.

Abstract

The theory of agricultural coalition formation is enhanced by incorporating non-monetary benefits, risk, and fairness. Producer's expected utility and investment decisions in the agricultural cooperative are affected by their perception about non-monetary benefits, risk and fairness associate with the cooperative investment. (Revised edition added in August 2002)

Suggested Citation

  • Puaha, Hubertus & Tilley, Daniel S., 2002. "Coalition Development In The Agricultural Marketing System," 2002 Annual meeting, July 28-31, Long Beach, CA 19721, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea02:19721
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.19721
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    References listed on IDEAS

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