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A Principal-Agent Approach To The Delegation Of Regulatory Authority

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  • Alevy, Jonathan E.

Abstract

This paper applies a multi-tasking model of moral hazard to study the delegation of regulatory authority for health and environmental risks. The model characterizes the conditions under which single and multiple bureaucratic agencies are optimal, and relates these findings to discussions of appropriate regulation of agricultural biotechnology

Suggested Citation

  • Alevy, Jonathan E., 2001. "A Principal-Agent Approach To The Delegation Of Regulatory Authority," 2001 Annual meeting, August 5-8, Chicago, IL 20764, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea01:20764
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.20764
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bernheim, B Douglas & Whinston, Michael D, 1986. "Common Agency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 923-942, July.
    2. Tirole, Jean, 1994. "The Internal Organization of Government," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(1), pages 1-29, January.
    3. Martimort, David, 1996. "The multiprincipal nature of government," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 673-685, April.
    4. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
    5. Hopenhayn, Hugo & Lohmann, Susanne, 1996. "Fire-Alarm Signals and the Political Oversight of Regulatory Agencies," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 12(1), pages 196-213, April.
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