Motivating Loyal Bureaucrats in Sequential Agency
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DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2023-0122
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Keywords
principal – agent; false moral hazard; sequential agency;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General
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