Administrative Federalism and a Central Government with Regionally Based Preferences
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DOI: 10.1023/A:1008799614576
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Cited by:
- Borge, Lars-Erik & Brueckner, Jan K. & Rattsø, Jorn, 2014. "Partial fiscal decentralization and demand responsiveness of the local public sector: Theory and evidence from Norway," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 153-163.
- Lisa Grazzini & Alessandro Petretto, 2017.
"Spillover Effects in a Federal Country with Vertical Tax Externalities,"
Public Finance Review, , vol. 45(5), pages 701-720, September.
- Lisa Grazzini & Alessandro Petretto, 2015. "Spillover Effects in a Federal Country with Vertical Tax Externalities," Working Papers - Economics wp2015_08.rdf, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa.
- Lisa Grazzini & Alessandro Petretto, 2015. "Spillover Effects in a Federal Country with Vertical Tax Externalities," Working papers 23, Società Italiana di Economia Pubblica.
- Kimiko Terai, 2008. "Interregional Disparities in Productivity and the Choice of Fiscal Regime," Working Papers 070813, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
- Lars-Erik Borge & Jan K. Brueckner & Jorn Rattso, 2012. "Partial Fiscal Decentralization and Public-Sector Heterogeneity: Theory and Evidence from Norway," CESifo Working Paper Series 3954, CESifo.
- Kimiko Terai, 2009. "Interregional Disparities in Productivity and the Choice of Fiscal Regime," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(3), pages 383-409, June.
- Brueckner, Jan K., 2009.
"Partial fiscal decentralization,"
Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 23-32, January.
- Jan K. Brueckner, 2007. "Partial Fiscal Decentralization," CESifo Working Paper Series 2137, CESifo.
- Jan K. Brueckner, 2007. "Partial Fiscal Decentralization," Working Papers 070804, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
- Torsten Schmidt, 2003. "Institutionelle Bedingungen eines Wettbewerbsföderalismus in Deutschland: Transaktionskosten stärker berücksichtigen," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 72(3), pages 458-471.
- Schmidt, Torsten, 2001. "Finanzreformen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Analyse der Veränderungen der Finanzverfassung von 1949 bis 1989," RWI Schriften, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, volume 67, number 67.
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Keywords
federalism; constitution; decentralization;All these keywords.
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