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An Empirical Study Of Common Property Resource: The Case Of Skipjack Fishery In The Western-Central Pacific Ocean

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  • Naito, Toyokazu

Abstract

A dynamic Cournot game model is used to predict the strategic behavior of harvesters engaged in a non-cooperative fishery on a common property resource. The model predicts that an increase in the current number of harvesters in a common property fishery will reduce both the equilibrium harvest level and the current resource rent for the individual harvester. Also, an increase in the future number of harvesters increases both two equilibrium levels. These predictions are tested using data from the Japanese skipjack fishery in the Western-central Pacific Ocean. The empirical results on the effect of changes in the current and future numbers of harvesters on the individual harvest rates and resource rent are consistent with theory.

Suggested Citation

  • Naito, Toyokazu, 2001. "An Empirical Study Of Common Property Resource: The Case Of Skipjack Fishery In The Western-Central Pacific Ocean," 2001 Annual meeting, August 5-8, Chicago, IL 20675, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea01:20675
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.20675
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