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Where Is The Walrasian Auctioneer For Agricultural Markets? An Examination Of The Marketing Institution

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Listed:
  • Moss, Charles B.
  • Schmitz, Troy G.
  • Schmitz, Andrew

Abstract

In the classical development of economic equilibrium and efficiency, transaction costs are seldom considered. This study develops a micro- market model of an agricultural market based on quality differences. The study then develops a model of market structure based on the New Theory of the Firm. Using the two models, we draw conclusions about economic potential for E-Commerce.

Suggested Citation

  • Moss, Charles B. & Schmitz, Troy G. & Schmitz, Andrew, 2001. "Where Is The Walrasian Auctioneer For Agricultural Markets? An Examination Of The Marketing Institution," 2001 Annual meeting, August 5-8, Chicago, IL 20637, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea01:20637
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.20637
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Milgrom, Paul, 1989. "Auctions and Bidding: A Primer," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 3-22, Summer.
    2. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
    3. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August.
    4. William Vickrey, 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 8-37, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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