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A Survey of Noncooperative Game Theory with Reference to Agricultural Markets: Part 2. Potential Applications in Agriculture

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  • Sexton, Richard J.

Abstract

This paper is the second of a two-part survey on noncooperative game theory relevant to agricultural markets. Part 1 of the survey focused on important game theory concepts, while this paper illustrates applications of the theory to agricultural markets. Game theory is relevant when markets are imperfectly competitive, and this paper argues that this condition is commonly met in agriculture. Specific topics of application include principal-agent models, auctions, and bargaining.

Suggested Citation

  • Sexton, Richard J., 1994. "A Survey of Noncooperative Game Theory with Reference to Agricultural Markets: Part 2. Potential Applications in Agriculture," Review of Marketing and Agricultural Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 62(02), pages 1-18, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:remaae:12484
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.12484
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Evans, Lewis & Meade, Richard, 2005. "The Role and Significance of Cooperatives in New Zealand Agriculture, A Comparative Institutional Analysis," Working Paper Series 3847, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.
    2. Brown, Colin G., 1997. "Chinese wool auctions: Failed agribusiness reform or future marketing channel?," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 175-189.
    3. Bullock, David S. & Salhofer, Klaus, 2003. "Judging agricultural policies: a survey," Agricultural Economics, Blackwell, vol. 28(3), pages 225-243, May.
    4. William W. Wilson & Bruce L. Dahl, 2004. "Transparency and Bidding Competition in International Wheat Trade," Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d'agroeconomie, Canadian Agricultural Economics Society/Societe canadienne d'agroeconomie, vol. 52(1), pages 89-105, March.
    5. Kinnucan, Henry W., 1995. "Price Bargaining Without Supply Control," Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 24(1), pages 119-127, April.
    6. Wilson, William W. & Dahl, Bruce L., 2000. "Import Tenders And Bidding Strategies In Wheat," Agricultural Economics Reports 23285, North Dakota State University, Department of Agribusiness and Applied Economics.
    7. Wilson, William W. & Diersen, Matthew A., 2001. "Competitive Bidding On Import Tenders: The Case Of Minor Oilseeds," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 26(1), pages 1-16, July.
    8. Evans, Lewis & Meade, Richard, 2005. "The Role and Significance of Cooperatives in New Zealand Agriculture, A Comparative Institutional Analysis," Working Paper Series 18942, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.
    9. Johnson, R.W.M., 1995. "Modelling Government Processes and Policies in Agriculture: A Review," Review of Marketing and Agricultural Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 63(03), pages 1-11, December.
    10. David S. Bullock & Klaus Salhofer & Jukka Kola, 1999. "The Normative Analysis of Agricultural Policy: A General Framework and Review," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(3), pages 512-535, September.
    11. Di Corato, Luca & Brady, Mark V., 2019. "Passive farming and land development: A real options approach," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 32-46.
    12. Chin, Ming-Chin & Weaver, Robert D., 2004. "Forward Contracting Specification Through Collective Bargaining," 2004 Annual meeting, August 1-4, Denver, CO 20006, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    13. repec:vuw:vuwscr:18942 is not listed on IDEAS

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