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Bidding for Sport Mega-Events

Author

Listed:
  • Richard Pomfret

    (School of Economics, University of Adelaide)

  • John K. Wilson

    (University of South Australia)

  • Bernhard Lobmayr

    (University of South Australia)

Abstract

Sport mega-events such as the Olympic Games and FIFA World Cup, or on a smaller scale the Commonwealth Games or regional events, attract competing bids from nations or cities. These bids are mostly made at tax-payers? expense and spending is often large and non-transparent. Our paper addresses the question of why large sums of public money are spent in an attempt to secure uncertain rights to host events which, according to ex post studies, often yield few gains. The paper analyses the economics of the bidding process, emphasising public choice aspects of mega-event bidding to identify the interaction of potential beneficiaries and policymakers' interests. We do not directly enter debates about legacies of hosting mega-events, but ask why public money is spent on a bidding process which is even less likely to realize net social benefits. The empirical part of the paper uses past bids from the state of South Australia, a demonstrated bidder for various sports mega (or not so mega-) events with a mixed record of success, as a case study of the economics of bidding.

Suggested Citation

  • Richard Pomfret & John K. Wilson & Bernhard Lobmayr, 2009. "Bidding for Sport Mega-Events," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2009-30, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.
    • Handle: RePEc:adl:wpaper:2009-30
    as

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    File URL: https://media.adelaide.edu.au/economics/papers/doc/wp2009-30.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-850, September.
    2. John K. Wilson & Richard Pomfret, 2009. "Government Subsidies for Professional Team Sports in Australia," Australian Economic Review, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, vol. 42(3), pages 264-275, September.
    3. Zhihao Yu, 2005. "Environmental Protection: A Theory of Direct and Indirect Competition for Political Influence," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 72(1), pages 269-286.
    4. B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1986. "Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 101(1), pages 1-31.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Krystian Zawadzki, 2015. "Estimation Of The Willingness-To-Pay For Preserving The Football Arena In Gdansk," "e-Finanse", University of Information Technology and Management, Institute of Financial Research and Analysis, vol. 11(1), pages 44-55, August.
    2. Christopher Hautbois & Milena M. Parent & Benoît Séguin, 2012. "How to win a bid for major sporting events? A stakeholder analysis of the 2018 Olympic Winter Games French bid," Post-Print hal-03550776, HAL.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    bidding; sports;

    JEL classification:

    • L83 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Sports; Gambling; Restaurants; Recreation; Tourism
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H76 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Other Expenditure Categories

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