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Searching for the EU Social Dialogue Model

In: Social Pacts, Employment and Growth

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  • Richard B. Freeman

    (Harvard University)

Abstract

The European Union and the United States operate different variants of market capitalism. The EU model uses social dialogue institutions to help determine economic outcomes, particularly in the labor market, whereas the US relies more on market forces. The theory of competitive markets provides a powerful framework for analyzing market driven economies and for assessing the conditions under which unfettered markets yield desirable outcomes. But there is no comparable framework for analyzing institution driven economies. This paper argues that models of efficient bargaining/the Coase Theorem offer the best framework for analyzing social dialogue economies and for identifying policies and institutional reforms to improve their functioning.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Richard B. Freeman, 2007. "Searching for the EU Social Dialogue Model," AIEL Series in Labour Economics, in: Nicola Acocella & Riccardo Leoni (ed.), Social Pacts, Employment and Growth, chapter 10, pages 221-238, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:aiechp:978-3-7908-1923-6_11
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-7908-1923-6_11
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. R. H. Coase, 2013. "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 837-877.
    2. Matthew O. Jackson & Simon Wilkie, 2005. "Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 72(2), pages 543-566.
    3. Hoffman, Elizabeth & Spitzer, Matthew L, 1982. "The Coase Theorem: Some Experimental Tests," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(1), pages 73-98, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Patrizio Tirelli & Nicola Acocella, 2008. "Trend inflation as a workers disciplining device in a general equilibrium model," Working Papers 142, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Jul 2008.
    2. Richard B. Freeman, 2007. "Labor Market Institutions Around the World," NBER Working Papers 13242, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Francesco Farina & Fulvio Fontini, 2009. "Voting on the tax rate when attitude to risk depends on skill heterogeneity," Department of Economic Policy, Finance and Development (DEPFID) University of Siena 0109, Department of Economic Policy, Finance and Development (DEPFID), University of Siena.
    4. Schmid, Günther & Modrack, Simone, 2008. "Employment dynamics in Germany: Lessons to be learned from the Hartz reforms," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Labor Market Policy and Employment SP I 2008-102, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    5. Chatterji, Monojit, 2008. "Training hold up and social labour markets," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 202-214, April.
    6. Antonioli, Davide & Mazzanti, Massimiliano, 2017. "Towards a green economy through innovations: The role of trade union involvement," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 286-299.
    7. Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Patrizio Tirelli & Nicola Acocella, 2013. "Trend inflation as a workers’ discipline device," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 40(2), pages 215-235, May.
    8. Riccardo Leoni, 2013. "Organization of work practices and productivity: an assessment of research on world- class manufacturing," Chapters, in: Anna Grandori (ed.), Handbook of Economic Organization, chapter 17, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    9. Boulhol, Herv, 2009. "Do capital market and trade liberalization trigger labor market deregulation?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 223-233, April.
    10. Richard Freeman, 2011. "New Roles for Unions and Collective Bargaining Post the Implosion of Wall Street Capitalism," Chapters, in: Susan Hayter (ed.), The Role of Collective Bargaining in the Global Economy, chapter 10, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    11. John Forth & Alex Bryson & Anitha George, 2016. "Explaining Cross-National Variation in Workplace Employee Representation," DoQSS Working Papers 16-10, Quantitative Social Science - UCL Social Research Institute, University College London.
    12. Hervé Boulhol, 2006. "Do capital market and trade liberalization trigger labor market deregulation?," Post-Print halshs-00118951, HAL.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Collective Bargaining; Social Partner; Efficient Outcome; Public Good Game; Social Dialogue;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J52 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation
    • J53 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Labor-Management Relations; Industrial Jurisprudence

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