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Comment on "Sovereign Bailouts and Senior Loans"

In: NBER International Seminar on Macroeconomics 2012

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  • Jayasri Dutta
  • Herakles Polemarchakis

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  • Jayasri Dutta & Herakles Polemarchakis, 2012. "Comment on "Sovereign Bailouts and Senior Loans"," NBER Chapters, in: NBER International Seminar on Macroeconomics 2012, pages 292-297, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:12781
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dutta, Jayasri & Morris, Stephen, 1997. "The Revelation of Information and Self-Fulfilling Beliefs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 231-244, March.
    2. Radner, Roy, 1979. "Rational Expectations Equilibrium: Generic Existence and the Information Revealed by Prices," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(3), pages 655-678, May.
    3. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1971. "The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(4), pages 561-574, September.
    4. Robert J Aumann, 1999. "Agreeing to Disagree," Levine's Working Paper Archive 512, David K. Levine.
    5. R. G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, 1956. "The General Theory of Second Best," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 24(1), pages 11-32.
    6. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2002. "Social Value of Public Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1521-1534, December.
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