IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/h/elg/eechap/3393_7.html
   My bibliography  Save this book chapter

Macroeconomic policies of the Economic and Monetary Union: theoretical underpinnings and challenges

In: Neo-Liberal Economic Policy

Author

Listed:
  • Philip Arestis
  • Malcolm Sawyer

Abstract

Over the past two decades there has been a prevailing shift in economic policy in many countries. This reflects the continuing rise of neo-liberalism – the doctrine that economic policy should ‘leave it to the market’ and that governments should retreat from market intervention. This book provides a balanced and comprehensive appraisal of these important policy developments. The authors examine the most notable trends in neo-liberal economic policy such as the withdrawal from the use of fiscal measures and the reliance on monetary policy. They discuss the neo-liberal view that the causes of unemployment lie in the operation of the labour market, in particular its inflexibility. They also assess the increasing inclination towards the liberalisation and deregulation of markets, most notably financial markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Philip Arestis & Malcolm Sawyer, 2004. "Macroeconomic policies of the Economic and Monetary Union: theoretical underpinnings and challenges," Chapters, in: Philip Arestis & Malcolm Sawyer (ed.), Neo-Liberal Economic Policy, chapter 7, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:3393_7
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.elgaronline.com/view/1843767945.00014.xml
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
    2. Atish Ghosh & Steven Phillips, 1998. "Warning: Inflation May Be Harmful to Your Growth," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 45(4), pages 672-710, December.
    3. Laurence M. Ball & Niamh Sheridan, 2004. "Does Inflation Targeting Matter?," NBER Chapters, in: The Inflation-Targeting Debate, pages 249-276, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. James Forder, 2004. "The theory of credibility: confusions, limitations and dangers," Chapters, in: Philip Arestis & Malcolm Sawyer (ed.), Neo-Liberal Economic Policy, chapter 2, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    5. James Forder, 2004. "Central bank independence: economic theory, evidence and political legitimacy," Chapters, in: Philip Arestis & Malcolm Sawyer (ed.), The Rise of the Market, chapter 6, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    6. Ellen E. Meade & Nathan Sheets, 2002. "Regional influences on U.S. monetary policy: some implications for Europe," International Finance Discussion Papers 721, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    7. Jorg Bibow, 2002. "The Monetary Policies of the European Central Bank and the Euro's (Mal-)Performance: A stability-oriented assessment," International Review of Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(1), pages 31-50.
    8. Kenneth N. Kuttner & Patricia C. Mosser, 2002. "The monetary transmission mechanism: some answers and further questions," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 8(May), pages 15-26.
    9. Jean-Paul Fitoussi & Jérôme Creel, 2002. "How to reform the European Central Bank," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03426609, HAL.
    10. Willem F. Duisenberg, 1999. "Economic and monetary union in Europe : the challenges ahead," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 185-194.
    11. Buiter, W.H. & Corsetti, G. & Roubini, N., 1992. "Excessive Deficits: Sense and Nonsence in the Treaty of Maastricht," Papers 674, Yale - Economic Growth Center.
    12. Nordhaus, William D, 1973. "The Effects of Inflation on the Distribution of Economic Welfare," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 5(1), pages 465-504, Part II F.
    13. Philip Arestis & Malcolm Sawyer, 2006. "The nature and role of monetary policy when money is endogenous," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Cambridge Political Economy Society, vol. 30(6), pages 847-860, November.
    14. Peter Downes & Aaron Drew & Patrice Ollivaud, 2003. "The OECD Medium-Term Reference Scenario: Economic Outlook No.74," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 372, OECD Publishing.
    15. Marco BUTI & Daniele FRANCO & Hedwig ONGENA, 1997. "Budgeetary Policies during Recessions : Retrospective Application of the Stability and Growth Pact” to the Post-War Period," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 1997041, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
    16. Dean Baker & Andrew Glyn & David Howell & John Schmitt, 2002. "Labor Market Institutions and Unemployment: A Critical Assessment of the Cross-Country Evidence," SCEPA working paper series. 2002-17, Schwartz Center for Economic Policy Analysis (SCEPA), The New School.
    17. Fertig, Michael & Schmidt, Christoph M., 2002. "Mobility within Europe – What do we (still not) know?," IZA Discussion Papers 447, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    18. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Philip Arestis & Malcolm Sawyer, 2019. "European integration and the ‘euro project’," Chapters, in: Jonathan Michie (ed.), The Handbook of Globalisation, Third Edition, chapter 15, pages 262-271, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. Canale, Rosaria Rita, 2006. "Positive effects of fiscal expansions on growth and debt," MPRA Paper 1432, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Nov 2006.
    3. Canale, Rosaria Rita, 2011. "Default risk and fiscal sustainability in PIIGS countries," MPRA Paper 32215, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Canale, Rosaria Rita & Napolitano, Oreste, 2009. "The recessive attitude of EMU policies: reflections on the italian experience, 1998–2008," MPRA Paper 20207, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Berlemann, Michael & Hilscher, Kai, 2010. "Effective monetary policy conservatism: A comparison of 11 OECD countries," HWWI Research Papers 2-21, Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWI).
    2. Reiner Eichenberger & Sergio Rossi, 2004. "Die Deregulierung der Zentralbanken: Auf zu einem internationalen Markt für gute Geldpolitik!," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 140(III), pages 327-353, September.
    3. Eckhard Hein & Achim Truger, 2005. "What ever happened to Germany? Is the decline of the former european key currency country caused by structural sclerosis or by macroeconomic mismanagement?," International Review of Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 19(1), pages 3-28.
    4. Andrew Hallett & Jan Libich, 2012. "Explicit inflation targets and central bank independence: friends or foes?," Economic Change and Restructuring, Springer, vol. 45(4), pages 271-297, November.
    5. repec:diw:diwwpp:dp1721 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Atsuyoshi Morozumi & Michael Bleaney & Zakari Mumuni, 2020. "Inflation targeting in low‐income countries: Does IT work?," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(4), pages 1529-1550, November.
    7. Bryan Chapple, 2006. "Monetary policy strategies and credibility - theory and practice," DNB Occasional Studies 404, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
    8. Binder, Carola, 2019. "Inequality and the inflation tax," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 1-1.
    9. Libich, Jan, 2008. "An explicit inflation target as a commitment device," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 43-68, March.
    10. Fratzscher, Marcel & Grosse-Steffen, Christoph & Rieth, Malte, 2020. "Inflation targeting as a shock absorber," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 123(C).
    11. Paresh Kumar Narayan & Seema Narayan & Sagarika Mishra, 2011. "Do Remittances Induce Inflation? Fresh Evidence from Developing Countries," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 77(4), pages 914-933, April.
    12. Arnone, Marco & Romelli, Davide, 2013. "Dynamic central bank independence indices and inflation rate: A new empirical exploration," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 385-398.
    13. Francesco Papadia & Gian Ruggiero, 1999. "Central Bank Independence and Budget Constraints for a Stable Euro," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 63-90, February.
    14. James Forder, 2002. "Interests and 'Independence': The European Central Bank and the theory of bureaucracy," International Review of Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(1), pages 51-69.
    15. Fatum, Rasmus, 2006. "One monetary policy and 18 central bankers: The European monetary policy as a game of strategic delegation," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(4), pages 659-669, May.
    16. Xavier Debrun, 2000. "Fiscal Rules in a Monetary Union: A Short-Run Analysis," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 323-358, October.
    17. Westelius Niklas J, 2009. "Inflation Range Targets with Hard Edges," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-28, April.
    18. Jose Ripoll, 2003. "National Appointments to Multinational Monetary Policy Making: A Role Conflict?," Macroeconomics 0301009, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    19. Rasmus Fatum, 2003. "One Monetary Policy and Eighteen Central Bankers: The European Monetary Policy as a Game of Strategic Delegation," EPRU Working Paper Series 03-19, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    20. Rostagno, Massimo & Altavilla, Carlo & Carboni, Giacomo & Lemke, Wolfgang & Motto, Roberto & Saint Guilhem, Arthur & Yiangou, Jonathan, 2019. "A tale of two decades: the ECB’s monetary policy at 20," Working Paper Series 2346, European Central Bank.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Economics and Finance;

    JEL classification:

    • E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E60 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - General
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:3393_7. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Darrel McCalla (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.e-elgar.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.