Majority Rule versus Supermajority Rules: Their Effects on Narrow and Broad Taxes
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DOI: 10.1177/1091142110373608
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Cited by:
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- Keith Dougherty, 2012. "Buchanan and Tullock’s apple," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(3), pages 403-406, September.
- Keith Dougherty & Julian Edward & Robi Ragan, 2015. "The value of formalism: re-examining external costs and decision costs with multiple groups," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 163(1), pages 31-52, April.
- Björn Kauder & Niklas Potrafke, 2016.
"Supermajorities and Political Rent Extraction,"
Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(1), pages 65-81, February.
- Björn Kauder & Niklas Potrafke, 2015. "Supermajorities and Political Rent Extraction," CESifo Working Paper Series 5512, CESifo.
- Keith Dougherty & Brian Pitts & Justin Moeller & Robi Ragan, 2014. "An experimental study of the efficiency of unanimity rule and majority rule," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(3), pages 359-382, March.
- Paul Pecorino, 2018. "Supermajority rule, the law of 1/n, and government spending: a synthesis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 175(1), pages 19-36, April.
- William B. Hankins, 2022. "Revisiting the effect of supermajority requirements on fiscal outcomes," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 88(4), pages 1599-1625, April.
- Keith L. Dougherty, 2015. "Supermajority rules," Chapters, in: Jac C. Heckelman & Nicholas R. Miller (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Voting, chapter 7, pages 102-116, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Ellen C. Seljan, 2015. "Ready to Bargain: The Effect of Fiscal Stress on Supermajority Requirements to Raise Taxes," Public Budgeting & Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(3), pages 24-43, September.
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Keywords
taxation; majority rule; constitutional economics; redistribution;All these keywords.
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