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The enterprise as community: firms, towns and universities

In: Handbook of Economic Organization

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  • Scott E. Masten

Abstract

This comprehensive and groundbreaking Handbook integrates economic and organization theories to help elucidate the design and evolution of economic organization. Economic organization is regarded both as a subject of inquiry and as an emerging disciplinary field in its own right, integrating insights from economics, organization theory, strategy and management, economic sociology and congnitive psychology. The contributors, who share this integrated approach, are distinguished scholars at the productive peak in their fields. Each original, state-of-the art chapter not only addresses foundational issues, but also identifies key issues for future research.

Suggested Citation

  • Scott E. Masten, 2013. "The enterprise as community: firms, towns and universities," Chapters, in: Anna Grandori (ed.), Handbook of Economic Organization, chapter 6, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:14110_6
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Martin C. McGuire & Mancur Olson, 1998. "The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The Invisible Hand and the Use of Force," International Economic Association Series, in: Silvio Borner & Martin Paldam (ed.), The Political Dimension of Economic Growth, chapter 3, pages 38-73, Palgrave Macmillan.
    2. Weingast, Barry R & Marshall, William J, 1988. "The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(1), pages 132-163, February.
    3. Pirrong, Craig, 1999. "The organization of financial exchange markets: Theory and evidence," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 329-357, November.
    4. Robert Gibbons, 1998. "Incentives in Organizations," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 115-132, Fall.
    5. North, Douglass C. & Weingast, Barry R., 1989. "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(4), pages 803-832, December.
    6. Gibbons, Robert, 1987. "Piece-Rate Incentive Schemes," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 5(4), pages 413-429, October.
    7. Coase, R H, 1974. "The Lighthouse in Economics," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(2), pages 357-376, October.
    8. Ulrich Bindseil & Christian Pfeil, 1999. "Specialization as a Specific Investment Into the Market: A Transaction Cost Approach to the Rise of Markets and Towns in Medieval Germany," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 155(4), pages 738-738, December.
    9. Hansmann, Henry, 1991. "Condominium and Cooperative Housing: Transactional Efficiency, Tax Subsidies, and Tenure Choice," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(1), pages 25-71, January.
    10. R. H. Britnell, 1981. "The Proliferation of Markets in England, 1200–1349," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 34(2), pages 209-221, May.
    11. Anna, Petrenko, 2016. "Мaркування готової продукції як складова частина інформаційного забезпечення маркетингової діяльності підприємств овочепродуктового підкомплексу," Agricultural and Resource Economics: International Scientific E-Journal, Agricultural and Resource Economics: International Scientific E-Journal, vol. 2(1), March.
    12. Scott E. Masten, 2011. "Public Utility Ownership in 19th-Century America: The "Aberrant" Case of Water," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 27(3), pages 604-654.
    13. Gary J. Miller, 1997. "The Impact of Economics on Contemporary Political Science," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(3), pages 1173-1204, September.
    14. Michihiro Kandori, 1992. "Social Norms and Community Enforcement," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 59(1), pages 63-80.
    15. Scott E. Masten, 2006. "Authority and Commitment: Why Universities, Like Legislatures, Are Not Organized as Firms," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(3), pages 649-684, September.
    16. Holmstrom, Bengt, 1999. "The Firm as a Subeconomy," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(1), pages 74-102, April.
    17. Masten, Scott E., 1995. "Old school ties: financial aid coordination and the governance of higher education," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 23-47, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Giacomo Degli Antoni & Magalì Fia & Lorenzo Sacconi, 2019. "Academic Shared Governance And Performance: Theoretical Issues And Empirical Evidence," Econometica Working Papers wp69, Econometica.
    2. Carla Facchini & Lorenzo Sacconi & Magalì Fia, 2019. "La governance delle universita' italiane dopo la Riforma Gelmini: un'indagine empirica sui processi decisionali," Econometica Working Papers wp68, Econometica.

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