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Do Democracies Breed Rent-Seeking Behavior?

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  • César Calderón
  • Alberto Chong

Abstract

Using objective institutional historical data we test the link between extent, duration, and transparency in democracies and rent-seeking behavior using time-series and panel data approaches. In this paper we focus on the case of Uruguay, an ethnically homogeneous country. We find three main results. First, democratic regimes are negatively linked with rent-seeking actions. Second, the longer the duration of democracy, the less rent-seeking in a society. Third, legislation enacted more transparently is negatively correlated with rent-seeking behavior. Our results are robust to the use of different econometric methods and basic robustness tests and are consistent with prevailing theory.

Suggested Citation

  • César Calderón & Alberto Chong, 2005. "Do Democracies Breed Rent-Seeking Behavior?," Research Department Publications 4415, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    • Handle: RePEc:idb:wpaper:4415
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    Cited by:

    1. César Calderón & Alberto Chong, 2006. "Rent Seeking and Democracy in Latin America: What Drives What?," Research Department Publications 4435, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.

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