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The Stock Market, the Market for Corporate Control and the Theory of the Firm: Legal and Economic Perspectives and Implications for Public Policy

In: The Modern Firm, Corporate Governance and Investment

Author

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  • Simon Deakin
  • Ajit Singh

Abstract

This book explores the revolutionary development of the theory of the firm over the past 35 years. Despite rapid progress in the field, new developments in the microeconomic and industrial organization literature have been relatively scant. This book attempts to redress the balance by providing a comprehensive overview of the theory of the firm before moving on to examine firms and the organization of their economic activities. The contributors also investigate the impact of ownership structure and board composition on firm performance and study how the institutional framework of an economy affects investment decisions.

Suggested Citation

  • Simon Deakin & Ajit Singh, 2009. "The Stock Market, the Market for Corporate Control and the Theory of the Firm: Legal and Economic Perspectives and Implications for Public Policy," Chapters, in: Per-Olof Bjuggren & Dennis C. Mueller (ed.), The Modern Firm, Corporate Governance and Investment, chapter 9, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:13362_9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Michael C. Jensen, 2010. "Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 22(1), pages 32-42, January.
    2. Yarrow, George K, 1985. "Shareholder Protection, Compulsory Acquisition and the Efficiency of the Takeover Process," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 34(1), pages 3-16, September.
    3. David Alexander Clark (ed.), 2006. "The Elgar Companion to Development Studies," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 3175.
    4. Singh, Ajit & Singh, Alaka & Weisse, Bruce, 2002. "Corporate governance, competition, the new international financial architecture and large corporations in emerging markets," MPRA Paper 53665, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, 1988. "Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers," NBER Chapters, in: Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences, pages 33-68, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Ajit Singh, 2008. "Stock Markets in Low and Middle Income Countries," Working Papers wp377, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
    7. Dale W. Jorgenson, 2001. "Information Technology and the U.S. Economy," Higher School of Economics Economic Journal Экономический журнал Высшей школы экономики, CyberLeninka;Федеральное государственное автономное образовательное учреждение высшего образования «Национальный исследовательский университет «Высшая школа экономики», vol. 5(1), pages 3-34.
    8. Singh, A., 1997. "Liberalisation, the Stock Market and the Market for Corporate Control: A Bridge Too Far for the Indian Economy?," Accounting and Finance Discussion Papers 97-af35, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    9. Ajit Singh, 1999. "Should Africa promote stock market capitalism?," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 11(3), pages 343-365.
    10. Alan J. Auerbach, 1988. "Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number auer88-1.
    11. Singh, A., 1991. "Corporate Takeovers: A Review," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 9206, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    12. Ajit Singh & Jack Glen & Ann Zammit & Rafael De-Hoyos & Alaka Singh & Bruce Weisse, 2005. "Shareholder Value Maximisation, Stock Market and New Technology: Should the US Corporate Model be the Universal Standard?," International Review of Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 19(4), pages 419-437.
    13. F. Scherer, 2006. "A New Retrospective on Mergers," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 28(4), pages 327-341, June.
    14. Black, Bernard S. & Gilson, Ronald J., 1998. "Venture capital and the structure of capital markets: banks versus stock markets," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 243-277, March.
    15. Mathias Siems, 2007. "Shareholder Protection around the World ("Leximetric II")," Working Papers wp359, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
    16. John Parkinson, 2003. "Models of the Company and the Employment Relationship," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 41(3), pages 481-509, September.
    17. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, 2000. "The End Of History For Corporate Law," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm136, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Feb 2001.
    18. John Buchanan & Simon Deakin, 2007. "Japan's Paradoxical Response to the new 'Global Standard' in Corporate Governance," Working Papers wp351, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
    19. Antoine Rebérioux, 2007. "Does shareholder primacy lead to a decline in managerial accountability?," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Cambridge Political Economy Society, vol. 31(4), pages 507-524, July.
    20. Michael Waterson (ed.), 2003. "Competition, Monopoly and Corporate Governance," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 2820.
    21. Simon Deakin, 2007. "Reflexive Governance and European Company Law," Working Papers wp346, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
    22. Gunther Tichy, 2001. "What Do We Know about Success and Failure of Mergers?," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 1(4), pages 347-394, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Singh, Ajit & Sheng, Andrew, 2011. "Islamic finance revisited: conceptual and analytical issues from the perspective of conventional economics," MPRA Paper 39007, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 10 Apr 2012.
    2. Prabirjit Sarkar & Ajit Singh, 2010. "Law, finance and development: further analyses of longitudinal data," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Cambridge Political Economy Society, vol. 34(2), pages 325-346, March.
    3. Konzelmann, S. & Fovargue-Davies, M., 2011. "Anglo-Saxon Capitalism in Crisis? Models of Liberal Capitalism and the Preconditions for Financial Stability," Working Papers wp422, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
    4. Sheng, Andrew & Singh, Ajit, 2012. "The Challenge of Islamic Finance," MPRA Paper 53044, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. John Armour & Simon Deakin & Prabirjit Sarkar & Mathias Siems & Ajit Singh, 2009. "Shareholder Protection and Stock Market Development: An Empirical Test of the Legal Origins Hypothesis," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 6(2), pages 343-380, June.
    6. Wald Nowotny, 2013. "The Economics of Financial Regulation," Chapters, in: Andreas Dombret & Otto Lucius (ed.), Stability of the Financial System, chapter 15, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    7. sarkar, prabirjit, 2011. "Common Law vs. Civil Law: Which System Provides More Protection to Shareholders and Creditors and Promotes Financial Development," MPRA Paper 32930, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Sue Konzelmann & Frank Wilkinson & Marc Fovargue-Davies & Duncan Sankey, 2009. "Governance, Regulation and Financial Market Instability: The Implciations for Policy," Working Papers wp392, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
    9. Igor Filatotchev & Gregory Jackson & Chizu Nakajima, 2013. "Corporate governance and national institutions: A review and emerging research agenda," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 30(4), pages 965-986, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Business and Management; Economics and Finance;

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law

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