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Felipe Varas

Personal Details

First Name:Felipe
Middle Name:
Last Name:Varas
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pva1032
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]

Affiliation

Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales
Universidad de los Andes (Chile)

Santiago/Las Condes, Chile
https://www.uandes.cl/facultad/ciencias-economicas-y-empresariales/
RePEc:edi:feuancl (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Marinovic, Ivan & Skrzypacz, Andrzej & Varas, Felipe, 2015. "Dynamic Certification and Reputation for Quality," Research Papers 3371, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  2. Marinovic, Ivan & Varas, Felipe, 2015. "CEO Horizon and Optimal Pay Duration," Research Papers 3385, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  3. Rodrigo Harrison & Roberto Muñoz; & Felipe Varas, 2008. "Auctions with Resale Market and Asymmetric Information," Documentos de Trabajo 332, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..

Articles

  1. Bertomeu, Jeremy & Marinovic, Iván & Terry, Stephen J. & Varas, Felipe, 2022. "The dynamics of concealment," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 227-246.
  2. Yunzhi Hu & Felipe Varas, 2021. "A Theory of Zombie Lending," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 76(4), pages 1813-1867, August.
  3. Felipe Varas & Iván Marinovic & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2020. "Random Inspections and Periodic Reviews: Optimal Dynamic Monitoring," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 87(6), pages 2893-2937.
  4. Ivan Marinovic & Felipe Varas, 2019. "CEO Horizon, Optimal Pay Duration, and the Escalation of Short‐Termism," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 74(4), pages 2011-2053, August.
  5. Felipe Varas, 2018. "Managerial Short-Termism, Turnover Policy, and the Dynamics of Incentives," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 31(9), pages 3409-3451.
  6. Iván Marinovic & Andrzej Skrzypacz & Felipe Varas, 2018. "Dynamic Certification and Reputation for Quality," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 10(2), pages 58-82, May.
  7. Iván Marinovic & Felipe Varas, 2016. "No news is good news: voluntary disclosure in the face of litigation," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 47(4), pages 822-856, November.
  8. Borja Larrain & Felipe Varas, 2013. "Equity Issues and Return Volatility," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 17(2), pages 767-808.
  9. Varas, Felipe & Walker, Eduardo, 2011. "Optimal close-to-home biases in asset allocation," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 328-337, March.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Marinovic, Ivan & Skrzypacz, Andrzej & Varas, Felipe, 2015. "Dynamic Certification and Reputation for Quality," Research Papers 3371, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.

    Cited by:

    1. Manuel Amador & Christopher Phelan, 2018. "Reputation and Sovereign Default," NBER Working Papers 24682, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Daniel Hauser, 2016. "Promoting a Reputation for Quality," PIER Working Paper Archive 16-014, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 29 Sep 2016.
    3. Wong, Tsz-Ning & Yang, Lily Ling, 2021. "Dynamic expert incentives in teams," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 125(C), pages 27-47.
    4. Bertomeu, Jeremy & Marinovic, Iván & Terry, Stephen J. & Varas, Felipe, 2022. "The dynamics of concealment," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 227-246.
    5. Dong Yan & Christian A. Vossler & Scott M. Gilpatric, 2020. "Product quality and third-party certification in potential lemons markets," Working Papers 2020-04, University of Tennessee, Department of Economics.
    6. Marina Halac & Andrea Prat, 2016. "Managerial Attention and Worker Performance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(10), pages 3104-3132, October.
    7. Stenzel, André & Wolf, Christoph, 2016. "Consumer Rating Dynamics," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145694, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    8. Michelson, Hope & Fairbairn, Anna & Ellison, Brenna & Maertens, Annemie & Manyong, Victor, 2021. "Misperceived quality: Fertilizer in Tanzania," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 148(C).
    9. Benjamin B. Bederson & Ginger Zhe Jin & Phillip Leslie & Alexander J. Quinn & Ben Zou, 2018. "Incomplete Disclosure: Evidence of Signaling and Countersignaling," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 10(1), pages 41-66, February.
    10. Chong Huang & Fei Li & Xi Weng, 2020. "Star Ratings and the Incentives of Mutual Funds," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 75(3), pages 1715-1765, June.
    11. Nikhil Vellodi, 2018. "Ratings Design and Barriers to Entry," Working Papers 18-13, NET Institute.
    12. Goel, Rajeev K. & Nelson, Michael A., 2020. "Do external quality certifications improve firms’ conduct? International evidence from manufacturing and service industries," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 97-104.
    13. Erfan Rezvani & Christian Rojas, 2022. "Firm responsiveness to consumers' reviews: The effect on online reputation," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(4), pages 898-922, November.

Articles

  1. Bertomeu, Jeremy & Marinovic, Iván & Terry, Stephen J. & Varas, Felipe, 2022. "The dynamics of concealment," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 227-246.

    Cited by:

    1. Anne Beyer & Ronald A. Dye, 2023. "On the Disclosure of Half-Truths and the Duty to Update," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(7), pages 4283-4311, July.
    2. Miles B. Gietzmann & Adam J. Ostaszewski, 2022. "The Kind of Silence: Managing a Reputation for Voluntary Disclosure in Financial Markets," Papers 2210.11315, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2023.

  2. Yunzhi Hu & Felipe Varas, 2021. "A Theory of Zombie Lending," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 76(4), pages 1813-1867, August.

    Cited by:

    1. Li, Xinyu & Wang, Huacheng & Li, Rong, 2023. "A hidden channel of “blood transfusion”: Internal capital market subsidies and zombie firms," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 55(6).
    2. Tuuli, Saara, 2023. "Who funds zombie firms: Banks or non-banks?," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 2/2023, Bank of Finland.
    3. Diana Bonfim & Geraldo Cerqueiro & Hans Degryse & Steven Ongena, 2023. "On-Site Inspecting Zombie Lending," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(5), pages 2547-2567, May.
    4. Hu, Yunzhi, 2022. "A dynamic theory of bank lending, firm entry, and investment fluctuations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
    5. Carletti, Elena & Leonello, Agnese & Marquez, Robert, 2023. "Loan guarantees, bank underwriting policies and financial stability," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 149(2), pages 260-295.
    6. Shen, Yu & Ren, Meixu & Zhao, Jingmei, 2023. "Bank competition and zombie company: Empirical evidence from China," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 297-318.
    7. Liu, Xuewen & Wang, Pengfei & Yang, Zhongchao, 2024. "Delayed crises and slow recoveries," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 152(C).
    8. Nicolas Aragon, 2022. "Debt Overhang, Risk Shifting and Zombie Lending," Working Papers 01/2022, National Bank of Ukraine.
    9. Zhang, Xiaoqian & Huang, Bin, 2022. "Does bank competition inhibit the formation of zombie firms?," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 1045-1060.
    10. Dainelli, Francesco & Bet, Gianmarco & Fabrizi, Eugenio, 2024. "The financial health of a company and the risk of its default: Back to the future," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 95(PB).
    11. Yongcuo Zhaxi & Yukihiro Yasuda, 2024. "Determinants of Zombie Firms: The Impact of Corporate Insolvency Efficiency and Cultural Factors," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 17(8), pages 1-13, July.
    12. Shangming Yang & Yanjiang Zhang & Jinyuan Zhang & Bochao Zhang, 2024. "Technology accessibility and the local government's incentive to aid zombie firms in China," Economics of Transition and Institutional Change, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 32(2), pages 501-523, April.
    13. Carletti, Elena & Leonello, Agnese & Marquez, Robert, 2023. "Loan guarantees, bank underwriting policies and financial fragility," Working Paper Series 2782, European Central Bank.
    14. Kaehny, Maximilian & Herweg, Fabian, 2022. "Do Zombies Rise When Interest Rates Fall? A Relationship-Banking Model," VfS Annual Conference 2022 (Basel): Big Data in Economics 264126, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    15. Wang, Congcong & Wang, Chong & Long, Huaigang & Zaremba, Adam & Zhou, Wenyu, 2024. "Green bond credit spreads and bank loans in China," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 94(C).
    16. Ren, Meixu & Zhao, Jinxuan & Zhao, Jingmei, 2023. "Why is it difficult for Chinese companies to operate across regions in China?—Evidence from zombie companies," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 87(C).

  3. Felipe Varas & Iván Marinovic & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2020. "Random Inspections and Periodic Reviews: Optimal Dynamic Monitoring," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 87(6), pages 2893-2937.

    Cited by:

    1. Liang, Yong & Sun, Peng & Tang, Runyu & Zhang, Chong, 2023. "Efficient resource allocation contracts to reduce adverse events," Other publications TiSEM 0bcf44d9-d0ac-4231-beaf-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    2. Rodivilov, Alexander, 2022. "Monitoring innovation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 297-326.
    3. Orlov, Dmitry, 2022. "Frequent monitoring in dynamic contracts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 206(C).
    4. Kfir Eliaz & Ran Spiegler, 2023. "Capability Building in Sluggish Organizations," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(3), pages 1703-1713, March.
    5. Iván Marinovic & Martin Szydlowski, 2022. "Monitoring with career concerns," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 53(2), pages 404-428, June.
    6. Mayer, Simon, 2022. "Financing breakthroughs under failure risk," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 807-848.
    7. Achim, Peter & Knoepfle, Jan, 2024. "Relational enforcement," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(2), May.
    8. Andrei Barbos, 2022. "Optimal contracts with random monitoring," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 51(1), pages 119-154, March.
    9. Alireza Fallah & Michael I. Jordan, 2023. "Contract Design With Safety Inspections," Papers 2311.02537, arXiv.org.
    10. Felix Zhiyu Feng & Wenyu Wang & Yufeng Wu & Gaoqing Zhang, 2023. "Ignorance Is Bliss: The Screening Effect of (Noisy) Information," Papers 2302.11128, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2024.
    11. Solan, Eilon & Zhao, Chang, 2021. "Dynamic monitoring under resource constraints," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 476-491.

  4. Ivan Marinovic & Felipe Varas, 2019. "CEO Horizon, Optimal Pay Duration, and the Escalation of Short‐Termism," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 74(4), pages 2011-2053, August.

    Cited by:

    1. Lel, Ugur & Tepe, Mete, 2021. "Investor horizon and managerial short-termism," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 1-20.
    2. Kwon, Shin Hyoung & Kim, Joongseo & Yim, Hyunsoon (Sean), 2023. "Looking far or close: The explanatory role of myopic management in the relationship between CEO-TMT power disparity and corporate social responsibility," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 167(C).
    3. Doruk Cetemen & Felix Zhiyu Feng & Can Urgun, 2021. "Renegotiation and Dynamic Inconsistency: Contracting with Non-Exponential Discounting," Working Papers 2021-58, Princeton University. Economics Department..
    4. Buchanan, Bonnie G. & Cao, Cathy Xuying & Wang, Shuhui, 2021. "Corporate social responsibility and inside debt: The long game," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    5. Małgorzata Janicka & Aleksandra Pieloch-Babiarz & Artur Sajnóg, 2020. "Does Short-Termism Influence the Market Value of Companies? Evidence from EU Countries," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 13(11), pages 1-22, November.
    6. Aktas, Nihat & Boone, Audra & Croci, Ettore & Signori, Andrea, 2021. "Reductions in CEO career horizons and corporate policies," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
    7. Michael Haylock, 2022. "Distributional differences in the time horizon of executive compensation," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 62(1), pages 157-186, January.
    8. Malgorzata Janicka & Artur Sajnog, 2021. "The European Union’s Environmental Policy and Long-Term Investments of Enterprises," European Research Studies Journal, European Research Studies Journal, vol. 0(4B), pages 335-355.
    9. Fouad Ben Abdelaziz & Souhir Neifar & Khamoussi Halioui, 2022. "Multilevel optimal managerial incentives and audit fees to limit earnings management practices," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 311(2), pages 587-610, April.
    10. Bertomeu, Jeremy & Marinovic, Iván & Terry, Stephen J. & Varas, Felipe, 2022. "The dynamics of concealment," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 227-246.
    11. Xiong, Yan & Jiang, Xu, 2022. "Economic consequences of managerial compensation contract disclosure," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(2).
    12. Fu, Xudong & Huang, Minjie & Tang, Tian, 2022. "Duration of executive compensation and maturity structure of corporate debt," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    13. Yu, Lin & Lv, Haixia & Fung, Anna & Feng, Keyou, 2024. "CEO turnover shock and green innovation: Evidence from China," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 894-908.
    14. Haylock, Michael, 2020. "Executives' short-term and long-term incentives - a distributional analysis," University of Tübingen Working Papers in Business and Economics 131, University of Tuebingen, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, School of Business and Economics.
    15. Cronqvist, Henrik & Ladika, Tomislav & Pazaj, Elisa & Sautner, Zacharias, 2024. "Limited attention to detail in financial markets: Evidence from reduced-form and structural estimation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 154(C).
    16. Mayer, Simon, 2022. "Financing breakthroughs under failure risk," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 807-848.
    17. Lili Ding & Zhongchao Zhao & Lei Wang, 2020. "Executive Incentives Matter for Corporate Social Responsibility under Earnings Pressure and Institutional Investors Supervision," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(6), pages 1-22, March.
    18. Lingfei Kong & Gunratan Lonare & Ahmet Nart, 2022. "Industry tournament incentives and corporate innovation strategies," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 45(1), pages 124-161, March.
    19. Gryglewicz, Sebastian & Mayer, Simon & Morellec, Erwan, 2020. "Agency conflicts and short- versus long-termism in corporate policies," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 136(3), pages 718-742.
    20. Małgorzata Janicka & Artur Sajnóg, 2022. "The ESG Reporting of EU Public Companies—Does the Company’s Capitalisation Matter?," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(7), pages 1-17, April.
    21. Szydlowski, Martin & Yoon, Ji Hee, 2022. "Ambiguity in dynamic contracts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 199(C).
    22. Pollock, Susan & Switzer, Lorne N. & Wang, Jun, 2023. "The dynamics of CEO equity vs. inside debt and firm performance," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).

  5. Felipe Varas, 2018. "Managerial Short-Termism, Turnover Policy, and the Dynamics of Incentives," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 31(9), pages 3409-3451.

    Cited by:

    1. Boleslavsky, Raphael & Taylor, Curtis R., 2024. "Make it 'til you fake it," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 217(C).
    2. Tiziano De Angelis & Peter Tankov & Olivier David Zerbib, 2022. "Climate Impact Investing," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 676 JEL Classification: G, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
    3. Pai, Mallesh & Deb, Rahul & Mitchell, Matthew, 2020. "(Bad) Reputation in Relational Contracting," CEPR Discussion Papers 14408, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Hoffmann, Florian & Pfeil, Sebastian, 2021. "Dynamic multitasking and managerial investment incentives," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 142(2), pages 954-974.
    5. Tak-Yuen Wong, 2019. "Dynamic Agency and Endogenous Risk-Taking," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(9), pages 4032-4048, September.

  6. Iván Marinovic & Andrzej Skrzypacz & Felipe Varas, 2018. "Dynamic Certification and Reputation for Quality," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 10(2), pages 58-82, May.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  7. Iván Marinovic & Felipe Varas, 2016. "No news is good news: voluntary disclosure in the face of litigation," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 47(4), pages 822-856, November.

    Cited by:

    1. Jeremy Bertomeu & Igor Vaysman & Wenjie Xue, 2021. "Voluntary versus mandatory disclosure," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 658-692, June.
    2. Maria Montero & Jesal Sheth, 2019. "Naivety about hidden information: An experimental investigation," Discussion Papers 2019-11, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    3. Ivan Marinovic & Martin Szydlowski, 2019. "Monitor Reputation and Transparency," 2019 Meeting Papers 125, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    4. Frenkel, Sivan & Guttman, Ilan & Kremer, Ilan, 2020. "The effect of exogenous information on voluntary disclosure and market quality," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 138(1), pages 176-192.
    5. Luciano Marchi & Sara Trucco, 2017. "La comunicazione al mercato delle performance economico-finanziarie: il ruolo del controllo di gestione," MANAGEMENT CONTROL, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2017(3), pages 55-78.
    6. Mazzi, Francesco & Slack, Richard & Tsalavoutas, Ioannis, 2018. "The effect of corruption and culture on mandatory disclosure compliance levels: Goodwill reporting in Europe," Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 52-73.
    7. Yunzhi Hu & Felipe Varas, 2021. "A Theory of Zombie Lending," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 76(4), pages 1813-1867, August.
    8. Allen H. Huang & Jianghua Shen & Amy Y. Zang, 2022. "The unintended benefit of the risk factor mandate of 2005," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 27(4), pages 1319-1355, December.
    9. Ginger Zhe Jin & Michael Luca & Daniel J. Martin, 2018. "Complex Disclosure," NBER Working Papers 24675, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Jung Min Kim & Daniel J. Taylor & Robert E. Verrecchia, 2021. "Voluntary disclosure when private information and disclosure costs are jointly determined," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 971-1001, September.
    11. You, Linqing & Chen, Zhuoqiong, 2022. "A theory of firm opacity and corporate social responsibility," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 145(C).
    12. Mayer, Simon, 2022. "Financing breakthroughs under failure risk," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 807-848.
    13. Miles B. Gietzmann & Adam J. Ostaszewski, 2022. "The Kind of Silence: Managing a Reputation for Voluntary Disclosure in Financial Markets," Papers 2210.11315, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2023.
    14. Aghamolla, Cyrus & An, Byeong-Je, 2021. "Voluntary disclosure with evolving news," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 140(1), pages 21-53.
    15. Frank S. Zhou, 2021. "Disclosure Dynamics and Investor Learning," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(6), pages 3429-3446, June.
    16. Aleksei Smirnov & Egor Starkov, 2022. "Bad News Turned Good: Reversal under Censorship," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(2), pages 506-560, May.
    17. Aghamolla, Cyrus & Smith, Kevin, 2023. "Strategic complexity in disclosure," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(2).
    18. Elizabeth Blankespoor & Bradley E. Hendricks & Joseph Piotroski & Christina Synn, 2022. "Real-time revenue and firm disclosure," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 27(3), pages 1079-1116, September.
    19. Mary Brooke Billings & Matthew C. Cedergren & Svenja Dube, 2021. "Does litigation change managers’ beliefs about the value of voluntarily disclosing bad news?," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 26(4), pages 1456-1491, December.
    20. Rahul Menon, 2020. "Voluntary Disclosures when There Is an Option to Delay Disclosure," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 37(2), pages 829-856, June.
    21. Schantl, Stefan F. & Wagenhofer, Alfred, 2020. "Deterrence of financial misreporting when public and private enforcement strategically interact," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(1).
    22. Arya, Anil & Ramanan, Ram N.V., 2024. "Long-term firm gains from short-term managerial focus: Myopia and voluntary disclosures," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(2).
    23. Miles B. Gietzmann & Adam J. Ostaszewski, 2023. "The kind of silence: managing a reputation for voluntary disclosure in financial markets," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 19(4), pages 419-447, December.
    24. Allen Huang & Kai Wai Hui & Reeyarn Zhiyang Li, 2019. "Federal Judge Ideology: A New Measure of Ex Ante Litigation Risk," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(2), pages 431-489, May.

  8. Borja Larrain & Felipe Varas, 2013. "Equity Issues and Return Volatility," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 17(2), pages 767-808.

    Cited by:

    1. Robert F. Stambaugh & Yu Yuan, 2015. "Mispricing Factors," NBER Working Papers 21533, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Xu, Shaojun, 2023. "Behavioral asset pricing under expected feedback mode," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 86(C).
    3. Walkshäusl, Christian, 2015. "Equity financing activities and European value-growth returns," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 27-40.
    4. Barroso, Pedro & Detzel, Andrew, 2021. "Do limits to arbitrage explain the benefits of volatility-managed portfolios?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 140(3), pages 744-767.
    5. Chen, Jian & Jiang, Fuwei & Li, Hongyi & Xu, Weidong, 2016. "Chinese stock market volatility and the role of U.S. economic variables," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 70-83.

  9. Varas, Felipe & Walker, Eduardo, 2011. "Optimal close-to-home biases in asset allocation," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 328-337, March.

    Cited by:

    1. Eduardo Walker, 2008. "Assessing Alternative Institutional Designs For Investment Regulation In Defined Contribution Pension Funds," Abante, Escuela de Administracion. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 11(2), pages 121-152.
    2. Castañeda, Pablo & Castro, Rubén & Fajnzylber, Eduardo & Medina, Juan Pablo & Villatoro, Félix, 2021. "Saving for the future: Evaluating the sustainability and design of Pension Reserve Funds," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    3. Paola De Vincentiis & Eleonora Isaia & Paola Zocchi, 2018. "Italian Pension Funds Struggling with Domestic Sovereign Risk," International Journal of Business and Management, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 13(2), pages 1-1, January.
    4. Brenes, Esteban R. & Metzger, Michael & Requena, Bernardo, 2011. "Strategic management in Latin America: Issues and assessment," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 231-235, March.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

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Rankings

This author is among the top 5% authors according to these criteria:
  1. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor
  2. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor
  3. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors
  4. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 3 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (2) 2008-04-15 2016-10-09
  2. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (1) 2016-10-09
  3. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (1) 2008-04-15
  4. NEP-HRM: Human Capital and Human Resource Management (1) 2016-10-09

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