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Deterrence of financial misreporting when public and private enforcement strategically interact

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  • Schantl, Stefan F.
  • Wagenhofer, Alfred

Abstract

This paper studies strategic interactions between public and private enforcement of accounting regulation and their consequences for the deterrence of financial misreporting. We develop an economic model with a manager, a public enforcement agency, and an investor and derive equilibrium strategies for manipulative effort, routine investigative effort, and costly private litigation. Our main results are as follows. (i) Strengthening private enforcement unambiguously enhances deterrence, whereas strengthening public enforcement can exacerbate misreporting, due to a crowding out of private enforcement. We provide conditions under which (ii) the enforcer's investigation incentives first increase and then decrease in the strength of private enforcement, (iii) public and private enforcement are strategic substitutes, (iv) the number of enforcement actions is misleading about public enforcement effectiveness, and (v) strengthening private enforcement decreases litigation risk. We also discuss implications of our results for empirical research.

Suggested Citation

  • Schantl, Stefan F. & Wagenhofer, Alfred, 2020. "Deterrence of financial misreporting when public and private enforcement strategically interact," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(1).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jaecon:v:70:y:2020:i:1:s0165410120300136
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2020.101311
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Accounting manipulation; Deterrence; Public enforcement; Investor litigation; Litigation risk;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting

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