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Alexander Stremitzer

Personal Details

First Name:Alexander
Middle Name:
Last Name:Stremitzer
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pst243
http://www.law.ucla.edu/faculty/all-faculty-profiles/professors/Pages/Alexander-Stremitzer.aspx
UCLA School of Law 385 Charles E. Young Drive East 1242 Law Building Los Angeles, CA 90095-1476

Affiliation

University of California - Los Angeles (UCLA) - School of Law

http://www.law.ucla.edu/Pages/default.aspx
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1476

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Florian Ederer & Alexander Stremitzer, 2013. "Promises and Expectations," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1931, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Mar 2016.
  2. Goller, Daniel & Stremitzer, Alexander, 2009. "Breach Remedies Inducing Hybrid Investments," Working Papers 72, Yale University, Department of Economics.
  3. Göller, Daniel & Stremitzer, Alexander, 2009. "Breach Remedies Including Hybrid Investments," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 282, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  4. Brooks, Richard & Stremitzer, Alexander, 2009. "On and Off Contract Remedies," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 290, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  5. Stremitzer, Alexander & Tabbach, Avraham, 2009. "Insolvency and Biased Standards - The Case for Proportional Liability," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 289, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  6. Stremitzer, Alexander, 2008. "Plaintiffs exploiting Plaintiffs," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 224, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  7. Stremitzer, Alexander, 2008. "Standard Breach Remedies, Quality Thresholds, and Cooperative Investments," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 242, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  8. Stremitzer, Alexander, 2008. "Opportunistic Termination," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 226, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.

Articles

  1. Göller, Daniel & Stremitzer, Alexander, 2014. "Breach remedies inducing hybrid investments," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 26-38.
  2. Stremitzer Alexander & Tabbach Avraham D., 2014. "The Robustness Case for Proportional Liability," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 14(1), pages 371-395, January.
  3. Richard R.W. Brooks & Alexander Stremitzer, 2012. "On and Off Contract Remedies Inducing Cooperative Investments," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 14(2), pages 488-516.
  4. Alexander Stremitzer, 2012. "The Measure of a MAC: A Machine-Learning Protocol for Analyzing Force Majeure Clauses in M&A Agreements," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 168(1), pages 206-208, March.
  5. Alexander Stremitzer, 2012. "Standard Breach Remedies, Quality Thresholds, and Cooperative Investments," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 28(2), pages 337-359.
  6. Richard R. W. Brooks & Alexander Stremitzer & Stephan Tontrup, 2012. "Framing Contracts: Why Loss Framing Increases Effort," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 168(1), pages 62-82, March.
  7. Alexander Stremitzer, 2012. "Opportunistic Termination," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 28(3), pages 381-406, August.
  8. Alexander Stremitzer, 2010. "If you Give Shareholders Power, do they Use it?," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 166(1), pages 58-61, March.
  9. Alexander Stremitzer, 2009. "Erga Omnes Norms and the Enforcement of International Law. Comment," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 165(1), pages 29-32, March.
  10. Alexander Stremitzer, 2008. "Exploiting Plaintiffs through Settlement: Divide and Conquer. Comment," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 164(1), pages 27-30, March.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Florian Ederer & Alexander Stremitzer, 2013. "Promises and Expectations," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1931, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Mar 2016.

    Cited by:

    1. Christoph Engel & André Schmelzer, 2017. "Committing the English and the Continental Way – An Experiment," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2017_16, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    2. Ederer, Florian & Stremitzer, Alexander, 2017. "Promises and expectations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 161-178.
    3. Brown, Martin & Schmitz, Jan & Zehnder, Christian, 2024. "Communication and hidden action: A credit market experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 218(C), pages 423-455.
    4. Jérôme Hergueux & Nicolas Jacquemet & Stéphane Luchini & Jason F Shogren, 2016. "Leveraging the Honor Code: Public Goods Contributions under Oath," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01379060, HAL.
    5. Sergio Mittlaender, 2019. "Morality, Compensation, and the Contractual Obligation," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 16(1), pages 119-142, March.
    6. Gersbach, Hans & Liu, Yulin & Tischhauser, Martin, 2018. "Versatile Forward Guidance: Escaping or Switching?," CEPR Discussion Papers 12559, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Vittorio Pelligra & Tommaso Reggiani & Daniel John Zizzo, 2020. "Responding to (un)reasonable requests by an authority," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 89(3), pages 287-311, October.
    8. Steven Schwartz & Eric Spires & Rick Young, 2019. "Why do people keep their promises? A further investigation," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 22(2), pages 530-551, June.
    9. Sorravich Kingsuwankul & Chloe Tergiman & Marie Claire Villeval, 2023. "Why do oaths work? Image concerns and credibility in promise keeping," Working Papers 2316, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    10. Sengupta, Arjun & Vanberg, Christoph, 2023. "Promise keeping and reliance damage," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 152(C).
    11. Di Bartolomeo Giovanni & Dufwenberg Martin & Papa Stefano & Passarelli Francesco, 2018. "Promises, expectations & causation," wp.comunite 00140, Department of Communication, University of Teramo.
    12. Matthias Lang & Simeon Schudy, 2023. "(Dis)honesty and the Value of Transparency for Campaign Promises," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 409, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    13. Antinyan, Armenak & Corazzini, Luca & D'Agostino, Elena & Pavesi, Filippo, 2023. "Watch your words: An experimental study on communication and the opportunity cost of delegation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 214(C), pages 216-232.
    14. V. Pelligra & T. Reggiani & D.J. Zizzo, 2016. "Responding to (Un)Reasonable Requests," Working Paper CRENoS 201614, Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia.
    15. Mittlaender, Sergio, 2024. "Incomplete promises and the norm of keeping promises," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
    16. Uyanga Turmunkh & Martijn J. van den Assem & Dennie van Dolder, 2019. "Malleable Lies: Communication and Cooperation in a High Stakes TV Game Show," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(10), pages 4795-4812, October.
    17. Giuseppe Attanasi & Pierpaolo Battigalli & Elena Manzoni & Rosemarie Nagel, 2019. "Belief-dependent preferences and reputation: Experimental analysis of a repeated trust game," Post-Print halshs-01948364, HAL.
    18. Henri Kuokkanen & Frederic Bouchon, 2021. "When team play matters: Building revenue management in tourism destinations," Tourism Economics, , vol. 27(2), pages 379-397, March.
    19. Attanasi, Giuseppe & Rimbaud, Claire & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2023. "Guilt Aversion in (New) Games: Does Partners' Payoff Vulnerability Matter?," IZA Discussion Papers 15960, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    20. Florian Ederer & Fr'd'ric Schneider, 2018. "The Persistent Power of Promises," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2129, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    21. Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Martin Dufwenberg & Stefano Papa, 2021. "Promises and Partner-Switch," Working Papers in Public Economics 215, Department of Economics and Law, Sapienza University of Roma.
    22. Debrah Meloso & Salvatore Nunnari & Marco Ottaviani, 2023. "Looking into Crystal Balls: A Laboratory Experiment on Reputational Cheap Talk," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(9), pages 5112-5127, September.
    23. Engel, Christoph & Kurschilgen, Michael, 2020. "The Fragility of a Nudge: the power of self-set norms to contain a social dilemma," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
    24. Kevin L. Cope & Charles Crabtree, 2020. "A Nationalist Backlash to International Refugee Law: Evidence from a Survey Experiment in Turkey," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 17(4), pages 752-788, December.
    25. Giuseppe Attanasi & Claire Rimbaud & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2020. "Guilt Aversion in (New) Games: the Role of Vulnerability," GREDEG Working Papers 2020-15, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.
    26. Anna Lou Abatayo & John Lynham & Katerina Sherstyuk, 2020. "Communication, Expectations, and Trust: An Experiment with Three Media," Games, MDPI, vol. 11(4), pages 1-26, October.
    27. Ronald Peeters & Marc Vorsatz & Markus Walzl, 2012. "Beliefs and truth-telling: A laboratory experiment," Working Papers 2012-17, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck, revised Nov 2014.
    28. Yadi Yang, 2021. "A Survey Of The Hold‐Up Problem In The Experimental Economics Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(1), pages 227-249, February.
    29. Kevin Grubiak, 2019. "Exploring Image Motivation in Promise Keeping - An Experimental Investigation," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 19-02, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    30. Nielsen, Kirby & Bhattacharya, Puja & Kagel, John H. & Sengupta, Arjun, 2019. "Teams promise but do not deliver," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2019-207, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    31. Theodore Eisenberg & Christoph Engel, 2016. "Unpacking Negligence Liability: Experimentally Testing the Governance Effect," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 13(1), pages 116-152, March.
    32. Khalmetski, Kiryl, 2016. "Testing guilt aversion with an exogenous shift in beliefs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 110-119.
    33. Rebecca Stone & Alexander Stremitzer, 2020. "Promises, Reliance, and Psychological Lock-In," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 49(1), pages 33-72.
    34. Kleinknecht, Janina, 2019. "A man of his word? An experiment on gender differences in promise keeping," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 251-268.
    35. Renaud Foucart & Jonathan H. W. Tan, 2024. "A test of loyalty," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 97(1), pages 109-137, August.
    36. Stephan Tontrup & Christopher Jon Sprigman, 2022. "Self‐nudging contracts and the positive effects of autonomy—Analyzing the prospect of behavioral self‐management," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 19(3), pages 594-676, September.
    37. Joris Gillet, 2021. "Is Voting for a Cartel a Sign of Cooperativeness?," Games, MDPI, vol. 12(2), pages 1-10, June.
    38. Khalmetski, Kiryl, 2019. "Evasion of guilt in expert advice," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 296-310.
    39. Pikulina, Elena S. & Tergiman, Chloe, 2020. "Preferences for power," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
    40. Heller, Yuval & Sturrock, David, 2020. "Promises and endogenous reneging costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
    41. Sengupta, Arjun & Vanberg, Christoph, 2020. "Promises and Opportunity Cost," Working Papers 0692, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
    42. Alexander Morell, 2014. "The Short Arm of Guilt: Guilt Aversion Plays Out More Across a Short Social Distance," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2014_19, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, revised Dec 2016.
    43. Ann-Kathrin Koessler & Lionel Page & Uwe Dulleck, 2021. "Public cooperation statements," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 16(4), pages 747-767, October.
    44. Oluseyi Aju & Eshani Beddewela, 2020. "Afrocentric Attitudinal Reciprocity and Social Expectations of Employees: The Role of Employee-Centred CSR in Africa," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 161(4), pages 763-781, February.
    45. Patel, Amrish & Smith, Alec, 2019. "Guilt and participation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 279-295.
    46. Morell, Alexander, 2019. "The short arm of guilt – An experiment on group identity and guilt aversion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 332-345.
    47. Amrish Patel & Alec Smith, 2018. "Guilt and participation," University of East Anglia School of Economics Working Paper Series 2018-01, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..

  2. Goller, Daniel & Stremitzer, Alexander, 2009. "Breach Remedies Inducing Hybrid Investments," Working Papers 72, Yale University, Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Göller, Daniel, 2012. "Expectation Damages and Bilateral Cooperative Investments," VfS Annual Conference 2012 (Goettingen): New Approaches and Challenges for the Labor Market of the 21st Century 62047, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

  3. Brooks, Richard & Stremitzer, Alexander, 2009. "On and Off Contract Remedies," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 290, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.

    Cited by:

    1. Stremitzer, Alexander, 2008. "Standard Breach Remedies, Quality Thresholds, and Cooperative Investments," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 242, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    2. Richard R.W. Brooks & Alexander Stremitzer, 2012. "On and Off Contract Remedies Inducing Cooperative Investments," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 14(2), pages 488-516.

  4. Stremitzer, Alexander & Tabbach, Avraham, 2009. "Insolvency and Biased Standards - The Case for Proportional Liability," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 289, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.

    Cited by:

    1. Friehe Tim, 2010. "On Avoidance Activities After Accidents," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 6(2), pages 181-195, September.
    2. Stremitzer Alexander & Tabbach Avraham D., 2014. "The Robustness Case for Proportional Liability," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 14(1), pages 371-395, January.
    3. Dari-Mattiacci Giuseppe & Hendriks Eva S., 2013. "Relative Fault and Efficient Negligence: Comparative Negligence Explained," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-40, June.
    4. Schweizer, Urs, 2011. "Vicarious Liability and the Intensity Principle," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 364, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.

  5. Stremitzer, Alexander, 2008. "Plaintiffs exploiting Plaintiffs," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 224, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.

    Cited by:

    1. Grechenig, Kristoffel & Sekyra, Michael, 2011. "No derivative shareholder suits in Europe: A model of percentage limits and collusion," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 16-20, March.
    2. Ehud Guttel & Shmuel Leshem, 2011. "Buying the Right to Harm: The Economics of Buyouts," CAE Working Papers 93, Aix-Marseille Université, CERGAM.

  6. Stremitzer, Alexander, 2008. "Standard Breach Remedies, Quality Thresholds, and Cooperative Investments," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 242, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.

    Cited by:

    1. Hideshi Itoh & Hodaka Morita, 2015. "Formal Contracts, Relational Contracts, and the Threat-Point Effect," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(3), pages 318-346, August.
    2. Goller, Daniel & Stremitzer, Alexander, 2009. "Breach Remedies Inducing Hybrid Investments," Working Papers 72, Yale University, Department of Economics.
    3. Göller, Daniel, 2012. "Expectation Damages and Bilateral Cooperative Investments," VfS Annual Conference 2012 (Goettingen): New Approaches and Challenges for the Labor Market of the 21st Century 62047, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    4. Buzard, Kristy & Watson, Joel, 2010. "Contract, Renegotiation, and Hold Up: Results on the Technology of Trade and Investment," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt3df3q4vg, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
    5. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2009. "Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments," CEPR Discussion Papers 7584, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Alessandro De Chiara, 2018. "Courts' Decisions, Cooperative Investments, and Incomplete Contracts," CEU Working Papers 2018_5, Department of Economics, Central European University.
    7. Schweizer, Urs, 2016. "Efficient incentives from obligation law and the compensation principle," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 54-62.
    8. Agamirova, Maria Е. (Агамирова, Мария) & Dzagurova, Nataliya B. (Дзагурова, Наталия), 2016. "The Legality of Vertical Restraints by the Rule of Reason and the Character of the Specific Investments [Правомерность Вертикальных Ограничивающих Соглашений С Позиции "Взвешенного Подхода&quo," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 6, pages 122-137, December.
    9. Zhiqi Chen & Xiaoqiao Wang, 2020. "Specific investment, supplier vulnerability and profit risks," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(9-10), pages 1215-1237, October.
    10. Rebecca Stone & Alexander Stremitzer, 2020. "Promises, Reliance, and Psychological Lock-In," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 49(1), pages 33-72.
    11. Göller, Daniel & Stremitzer, Alexander, 2009. "Breach Remedies Including Hybrid Investments," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 282, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    12. Christoph Engel & Lars Freund, 2017. "Behaviorally Efficient Remedies – An Experiment," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2017_17, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.

  7. Stremitzer, Alexander, 2008. "Opportunistic Termination," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 226, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.

    Cited by:

    1. Omri Ben-Shahar & Eric A. Posner, 2011. "The Right to Withdraw in Contract Law," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 40(1), pages 115-148.
    2. Nell, Mathias, 2007. "Contracts induced by means of bribery: Should they be void or valid?," Passauer Diskussionspapiere, Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe V-53-07, University of Passau, Faculty of Business and Economics.
    3. Mathias Nell, 2009. "Contracts obtained by means of bribery: should they be void or valid?," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 159-176, April.
    4. Richard R.W. Brooks & Alexander Stremitzer, 2012. "On and Off Contract Remedies Inducing Cooperative Investments," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 14(2), pages 488-516.

Articles

  1. Göller, Daniel & Stremitzer, Alexander, 2014. "Breach remedies inducing hybrid investments," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 26-38.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Stremitzer Alexander & Tabbach Avraham D., 2014. "The Robustness Case for Proportional Liability," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 14(1), pages 371-395, January.

    Cited by:

    1. Tim Friehe & Eric Langlais, 2017. "Prevention and Cleanup of Dynamic Harm Under Environmental Liability," Post-Print hal-01549786, HAL.
    2. Gomez, Fernando & Penalva, Jose, 2015. "Tort reform and the theory of coordinating tort and insurance," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 83-97.
    3. Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat, 2015. "Disgorgement Damages for Accidents," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 44(2), pages 249-276.

  3. Alexander Stremitzer, 2012. "Standard Breach Remedies, Quality Thresholds, and Cooperative Investments," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 28(2), pages 337-359.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  4. Richard R. W. Brooks & Alexander Stremitzer & Stephan Tontrup, 2012. "Framing Contracts: Why Loss Framing Increases Effort," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 168(1), pages 62-82, March.

    Cited by:

    1. Eszter Czibor & Danny Hsu & David Jimenez-Gomez & Susanne Neckermann & Burcu Subasi, 2022. "Loss-Framed Incentives and Employee (Mis-)Behavior," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(10), pages 7518-7537, October.
    2. Richard R. W. Brooks & Alexander Stremitzer & Stephan Tontrup, 2017. "Stretch It but Don't Break It: The Hidden Cost of Contract Framing," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 46(2), pages 399-426.
    3. Alex Imas & Sally Sadoff & Anya Samek, 2017. "Do People Anticipate Loss Aversion?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 63(5), pages 1271-1284, May.
    4. Lamar Pierce & Alex Rees-Jones & Charlotte Blank, 2020. "The Negative Consequences of Loss-Framed Performance Incentives," NBER Working Papers 26619, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Astrid Gamba & Luca Stanca, 2023. "Mis-judging merit: the effects of adjudication errors in contests," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 26(3), pages 550-587, July.
    6. Gary Charness & Celia Blanco-Jimenez & Lara Ezquerra & Ismael Rodriguez-Lara, 2019. "Cheating, incentives, and money manipulation," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 22(1), pages 155-177, March.
    7. Lance Xu, 2024. "Advanced age predicts increased susceptibility to attribute, goal, and risky-choice framing in negative frame valences," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 11(1), pages 1-10, December.
    8. Leon Zolotoy & Don O’Sullivan & Geoffrey P. Martin, 2022. "Behavioural Agency and Firm Productivity: Revisiting the Incentive Alignment Qualities of Stock Options," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(7), pages 1756-1787, November.
    9. Jonathan Quidt & Francesco Fallucchi & Felix Kölle & Daniele Nosenzo & Simone Quercia, 2017. "Bonus versus penalty: How robust are the effects of contract framing?," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 3(2), pages 174-182, December.
    10. Paul J. Ferraro & J. Dustin Tracy, 2021. "A reassessment of the potential for loss-framed incentive contracts to increase productivity: a meta-analysis and a real-effort experiment," Working Papers 21-20, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    11. De Paola, Maria & Gioia, Francesca & Pupo, Valeria, 2020. "Selection and Incentives under Time Pressure: The Importance of Framing," IZA Discussion Papers 13474, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    12. Stephan Tontrup & Christopher Jon Sprigman, 2022. "Self‐nudging contracts and the positive effects of autonomy—Analyzing the prospect of behavioral self‐management," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 19(3), pages 594-676, September.
    13. Nadja Kairies-Schwarz & Claudia Souček, 2020. "Performance Pay in Hospitals: An Experiment on Bonus–Malus Incentives," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 17(22), pages 1-29, November.
    14. Essl, Andrea & Jaussi, Stefanie, 2017. "Choking under time pressure: The influence of deadline-dependent bonus and malus incentive schemes on performance," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 127-137.
    15. Christoph Engel & Urs Schweizer, 2012. "Testing Contracts 29th International Seminar on the New Institutional Economics June 15-18, 2011, Krakow, Poland," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 168(1), pages 1-4, March.
    16. K. Hilken & S. Rosenkranz & K.J.M. De Jaegher & M. Jegers, 2013. "Reference Points, Performance and Ability: A Real Effort Experiment on Framed Incentive Schemes," Working Papers 13-15, Utrecht School of Economics.

  5. Alexander Stremitzer, 2012. "Opportunistic Termination," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 28(3), pages 381-406, August.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  6. Alexander Stremitzer, 2008. "Exploiting Plaintiffs through Settlement: Divide and Conquer. Comment," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 164(1), pages 27-30, March.

    Cited by:

    1. Yeon-Koo Che & Kathryn E. Spier, 2008. "Exploiting Plaintiffs through Settlement: Divide and Conquer," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 164(1), pages 4-23, March.

More information

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 7 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-LAW: Law and Economics (6) 2008-02-23 2008-03-08 2009-12-11 2010-01-10 2010-04-17 2010-06-04. Author is listed
  2. NEP-CBE: Cognitive and Behavioural Economics (1) 2013-12-29
  3. NEP-EVO: Evolutionary Economics (1) 2013-12-29
  4. NEP-EXP: Experimental Economics (1) 2013-12-29
  5. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (1) 2008-02-23
  6. NEP-PBE: Public Economics (1) 2008-02-23
  7. NEP-REG: Regulation (1) 2008-03-08

Corrections

All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. For general information on how to correct material on RePEc, see these instructions.

To update listings or check citations waiting for approval, Alexander Stremitzer should log into the RePEc Author Service.

To make corrections to the bibliographic information of a particular item, find the technical contact on the abstract page of that item. There, details are also given on how to add or correct references and citations.

To link different versions of the same work, where versions have a different title, use this form. Note that if the versions have a very similar title and are in the author's profile, the links will usually be created automatically.

Please note that most corrections can take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.