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Responding to (Un)Reasonable Requests

Author

Listed:
  • Pelligra, Vittorio

    (University of Cagliari)

  • Reggiani, Tommaso G.

    (Cardiff University)

  • Zizzo, Daniel John

    (Newcastle University)

Abstract

We consider the notions of static and dynamic reasonableness of requests in a trust game experiment. We vary systematically the experimental norm of what is expected from trustees to return to trustors, both in terms of level of each request and in terms of sequence of the requests. Static reasonableness matters in a self-biased way, in the sense that low requests justify returning less but high requests tend to be ignored. Dynamic reasonableness also matters, in the sense that, if requests keep increasing, trustees return less than if requests of different size are presented in random or decreasing order. Requests never systematically increase trustworthiness, but may decrease it.

Suggested Citation

  • Pelligra, Vittorio & Reggiani, Tommaso G. & Zizzo, Daniel John, 2016. "Responding to (Un)Reasonable Requests," IZA Discussion Papers 10189, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
  • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp10189
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    Cited by:

    1. Vittorio Pelligra & Tommaso Reggiani & Daniel John Zizzo, 2020. "Responding to (un)reasonable requests by an authority," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 89(3), pages 287-311, October.
    2. Giuseppe Attanasi & Claire Rimbaud & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2020. "Guilt Aversion in (New) Games: the Role of Vulnerability," GREDEG Working Papers 2020-15, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.
    3. Anastasia Danilov & Kiryl Khalmetski & Dirk Sliwka, 2018. "Norms and Guilt," CESifo Working Paper Series 6999, CESifo.
    4. Karakostas, Alexandros & Zizzo, Daniel John, 2016. "Compliance and the power of authority," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 67-80.
    5. Elisa Cavatorta & Daniel John Zizzo & Yousef Daoud, 2020. "Does exposure to violence affect reciprocity? Experimental evidence from the West Bank," Discussion Papers Series 614, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
    6. Riccardo Ghidoni & Matteo Ploner, 2021. "When do the expectations of others matter? Experimental evidence on distributional justice and guilt aversion," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 91(2), pages 189-234, September.
    7. Morell, Alexander, 2019. "The short arm of guilt – An experiment on group identity and guilt aversion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 332-345.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    moral wiggle room; reasonableness; norms; trustworthiness; trust; moral licensing;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

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