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Michael Richter

Not to be confused with: Michael Richter

Personal Details

First Name:Michael
Middle Name:
Last Name:Richter
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pri234
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
http://mrichter.co/
Terminal Degree:2012 Department of Economics; New York University (NYU) (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

(50%) Zicklin School of Business
Baruch College
City University of New York (CUNY)

New York City, New York (United States)
http://zicklin.baruch.cuny.edu/
RePEc:edi:zscunus (more details at EDIRC)

(50%) Department of Economics
Royal Holloway

Egham, United Kingdom
http://rhul.ac.uk/Economics/
RePEc:edi:derhbuk (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Richter, Michael & Rubinstein, Ariel, 2015. "Back to Fundamentals: Equilibrium in Abstract Economies," Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers 275833, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research.

Articles

  1. Christopher P. Chambers & Michael Richter, 2023. "Ordinal allocation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 60(1), pages 5-14, January.
  2. Guney, Begum & Richter, Michael, 2022. "Games with switching costs and endogenous references," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(2), May.
  3. Michael Richter & Ariel Rubinstein, 2021. "Holding a Group Together: Non-Game Theory Versus Game Theory," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 131(638), pages 2629-2641.
  4. Richter, Michael & Rubinstein, Ariel, 2020. "The permissible and the forbidden," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
  5. Richter, Michael & Rubinstein, Ariel, 2019. ""Convex preferences": a new definition," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(4), November.
  6. Richter, Michael, 2019. "Mechanism design with budget constraints and a population of agents," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 30-47.
  7. Guney, Begum & Richter, Michael & Tsur, Matan, 2018. "Aspiration-based choice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 935-956.
  8. Guney, Begum & Richter, Michael, 2018. "Costly switching from a status quo," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 55-70.
  9. Guney, Begum & Richter, Michael, 2015. "An experiment on aspiration-based choice," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 512-526.
  10. Michael Richter & Ariel Rubinstein, 2015. "Back to Fundamentals: Equilibrium in Abstract Economies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(8), pages 2570-2594, August.
  11. Richter, Michael, 2014. "Fully absorbing dynamic compromise," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 92-104.
  12. Kfir Eliaz & Michael Richter & Ariel Rubinstein, 2011. "Choosing the two finalists," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 46(2), pages 211-219, February.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Richter, Michael & Rubinstein, Ariel, 2015. "Back to Fundamentals: Equilibrium in Abstract Economies," Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers 275833, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research.

    Cited by:

    1. Tony Bryant & Doug McLeod, 2020. "The Guidance of an Enterprise Economy," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 96(313), pages 209-210, June.
    2. Ivan Balbuzanov & Maciej H. Kotowski, 2019. "Endowments, Exclusion, and Exchange," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 87(5), pages 1663-1692, September.
    3. Christopher Chambers & Alan Miller & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2015. "Closure and Preferences," GSIA Working Papers 2015-E36, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
    4. Patrick Beissner & Frank Riedel, 2016. "Knight--Walras Equilibria," Papers 1605.04385, arXiv.org.
    5. Patrick Beissner & Frank Riedel, 2019. "Equilibria Under Knightian Price Uncertainty," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 87(1), pages 37-64, January.
    6. Beissner, Patrick & Werner, Jan, 2023. "Optimal allocations with α-MaxMin utilities, Choquet expected utilities, and Prospect Theory," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(3), July.
    7. O'Callaghan, Patrick, 2016. "Measuring utility without mixing apples and oranges and eliciting beliefs about stock prices," MPRA Paper 69363, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Somdeb Lahiri, 2017. "Competitive Equilibrium in Generalized Games: A New Interpretation," Studies in Microeconomics, , vol. 5(1), pages 35-52, June.
    9. Olkhov, Victor, 2018. "Economic and Financial Transactions Govern Business Cycles," MPRA Paper 93269, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Victor Olkhov, 2018. "Econophysics Beyond General Equilibrium: the Business Cycle Model," Papers 1804.04721, arXiv.org.
    11. Ariel Rubinstein & Kemal Yıldız, 2022. "An étude in modeling the definability of equilibrium," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(4), pages 543-552, December.
    12. Olkhov, Victor, 2018. "Economic Transactions Govern Business Cycles," MPRA Paper 88531, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 19 Aug 2018.
    13. Pycia, Marek & Miralles, Antonio, 2020. "Foundations of Pseudomarkets: Walrasian Equilibria for Discrete Resources," CEPR Discussion Papers 15161, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    14. M. Ali Khan & Metin Uyan{i}k, 2018. "Topological Connectedness and Behavioral Assumptions on Preferences: A Two-Way Relationship," Papers 1810.02004, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2018.
    15. Herings, P. Jean-Jacques, 2024. "Expectational equilibria in many-to-one matching models with contracts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 216(C).
    16. Herings, P. Jean-Jacques, 2020. "Expectational Equilibria in Many-to-one Matching Models with Contracts - A Reformulation of Competitive Equilibrium," Research Memorandum 018, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
    17. Richter, Michael & Rubinstein, Ariel, 2020. "The permissible and the forbidden," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
    18. Klemperer, Paul & Baldwin, Elizabeth, 2019. "Understanding Preferences: "Demand Types", and the Existence of Equilibrium with Indivisibilities," CEPR Discussion Papers 13586, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    19. Hamed Hamze Bajgiran & Federico Echenique, 2022. "Closure operators: Complexity and applications to classification and decision-making," Papers 2202.05339, arXiv.org, revised May 2022.
    20. Richter, Michael & Rubinstein, Ariel, 2024. "Unilateral stability in matching problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 216(C).
    21. Balbuzanov, Ivan & Kotowski, Maciej, 2019. "The Property Rights Theory of Production Networks," Working Paper Series rwp19-033, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    22. Annie Tubadji, 2020. "Value-Free Analysis of Values: A Culture-Based Development Approach," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(22), pages 1-17, November.
    23. Brendan Markey-Towler, 2016. "Law of the jungle: firm survival and price dynamics in evolutionary markets," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 655-696, July.

Articles

  1. Guney, Begum & Richter, Michael, 2022. "Games with switching costs and endogenous references," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(2), May.

    Cited by:

    1. Yevgeny Tsodikovich & Xavier Venel & Anna Zseleva, 2022. "Folk Theorems in Repeated Games with Switching Costs," Working Papers hal-03888188, HAL.
    2. Tóbiás, Áron, 2023. "Rational Altruism," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 207(C), pages 50-80.

  2. Richter, Michael & Rubinstein, Ariel, 2020. "The permissible and the forbidden," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).

    Cited by:

    1. Marek Hudik, 2020. "Equilibrium as compatibility of plans," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 89(3), pages 349-368, October.
    2. Ariel Rubinstein & Kemal Yıldız, 2022. "An étude in modeling the definability of equilibrium," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(4), pages 543-552, December.
    3. Alvaro Sandroni & Leo Katz, 2024. "The leveling axiom," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 96(1), pages 135-152, February.
    4. Leo Katz & Alvaro Sandroni, 2021. "The (Non) Economic Properties of the Law," Games, MDPI, vol. 12(1), pages 1-8, March.
    5. Cole, Richard & Tao, Yixin, 2021. "On the existence of Pareto Efficient and envy-free allocations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).
    6. Richter, Michael & Rubinstein, Ariel, 2024. "Unilateral stability in matching problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 216(C).

  3. Richter, Michael & Rubinstein, Ariel, 2019. ""Convex preferences": a new definition," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(4), November.

    Cited by:

    1. Christopher Chambers & Alan Miller & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2015. "Closure and Preferences," GSIA Working Papers 2015-E36, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
    2. Victor H. Aguiar & Per Hjertstrand & Roberto Serrano, 2020. "Rationalizable Incentives: Interim Implementation of Sets in Rationalizable Strategies," Working Papers 2020-16, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    3. Victor H. Aguiar & Per Hjertstrand & Roberto Serrano, 2022. "A Rationalization of the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference," University of Western Ontario, Departmental Research Report Series 20229, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.

  4. Richter, Michael, 2019. "Mechanism design with budget constraints and a population of agents," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 30-47.

    Cited by:

    1. Boulatov, Alexei & Severinov, Sergei, 2021. "Optimal and efficient mechanisms with asymmetrically budget constrained buyers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 155-178.
    2. Xie, Yimei & Ding, Chuan & Li, Yang & Wang, Kaihong, 2023. "Optimal incentive contract in continuous time with different behavior relationships between agents," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 86(C).
    3. Jianxin Rong & Ning Sun & Dazhong Wang, 2019. "A New Evaluation Criterion for Allocation Mechanisms with Application to Vehicle License Allocations in China," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 4(1), pages 39-86, November.
    4. Naoki Kojima, 2014. "Mechanism design to the budget constrained buyer: a canonical mechanism approach," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(3), pages 693-719, August.
    5. Holzer, Jorge & McConnell, Kenneth, 2023. "Extraction rights allocation with liquidity constraints," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
    6. Carbajal, Juan Carlos & Mu'alem, Ahuva, 2020. "Selling mechanisms for a financially constrained buyer," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 386-405.
    7. Ghosh, Gagan, 2021. "Simultaneous auctions with budgets: Equilibrium existence and characterization," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 75-93.

  5. Guney, Begum & Richter, Michael & Tsur, Matan, 2018. "Aspiration-based choice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 935-956.

    Cited by:

    1. Vladimir Novak & Andrei Matveenko & Silvio Ravaioli, 2023. "The Status Quo and Belief Polarization of Inattentive Agents: Theory and Experiment," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2023_385, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    2. Guney, Begum & Richter, Michael, 2018. "Costly switching from a status quo," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 55-70.
    3. Eszter Czibor & Danny Hsu & David Jimenez-Gomez & Susanne Neckermann & Burcu Subasi, 2022. "Loss-Framed Incentives and Employee (Mis-)Behavior," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(10), pages 7518-7537, October.
    4. José Ramón Uriarte & Stefan Sperlich, 2021. "A behavioural model of minority language shift: Theory and empirical evidence," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 16(6), pages 1-17, June.
    5. DasGupta, Ranjan & Dhochak, Monika, 2021. "Risk-Antecedents of Firms and Strategic Mediators – New Evidence from a Cross-Country Analysis," American Business Review, Pompea College of Business, University of New Haven, vol. 24(1), pages 3-35, May.
    6. Stefan Sperlich & Jose-Ramon Uriarte, 2019. "The economics of minority language use: theory and empirical evidence for a language game model," Papers 1908.11604, arXiv.org.

  6. Guney, Begum & Richter, Michael, 2018. "Costly switching from a status quo," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 55-70.

    Cited by:

    1. Miguel Costa-Gomes & Georgios Gerasimou, 2020. "Status Quo Bias and the Decoy Effect: A Comparative Analysis in Choice under Risk," Papers 2006.14868, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2021.
    2. Barokas, Guy, 2024. "Positively correlated choice," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 62-71.
    3. Matthew Kovach & Elchin Suleymanov, 2021. "Reference Dependence and Random Attention," Papers 2106.13350, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2023.
    4. Yevgeny Tsodikovich & Xavier Venel & Anna Zseleva, 2022. "Folk Theorems in Repeated Games with Switching Costs," Working Papers hal-03888188, HAL.
    5. Tóbiás, Áron, 2023. "Rational Altruism," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 207(C), pages 50-80.

  7. Guney, Begum & Richter, Michael, 2015. "An experiment on aspiration-based choice," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 512-526.

    Cited by:

    1. Guney, Begum & Richter, Michael, 2018. "Costly switching from a status quo," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 55-70.
    2. José Ramón Uriarte & Stefan Sperlich, 2021. "A behavioural model of minority language shift: Theory and empirical evidence," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 16(6), pages 1-17, June.
    3. Guney, Begum & Richter, Michael & Tsur, Matan, 2018. "Aspiration-based choice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 935-956.
    4. Aguiar, Victor H., 2017. "Random categorization and bounded rationality," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 159(C), pages 46-52.
    5. Stefan Sperlich & Jose-Ramon Uriarte, 2019. "The economics of minority language use: theory and empirical evidence for a language game model," Papers 1908.11604, arXiv.org.

  8. Michael Richter & Ariel Rubinstein, 2015. "Back to Fundamentals: Equilibrium in Abstract Economies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(8), pages 2570-2594, August.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  9. Richter, Michael, 2014. "Fully absorbing dynamic compromise," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 92-104.

    Cited by:

    1. Anesi, Vincent & Duggan, John, 2018. "Existence and indeterminacy of markovian equilibria in dynamic bargaining games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(2), May.
    2. Nunnari, Salvatore, 2021. "Dynamic legislative bargaining with veto power: Theory and experiments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 186-230.
    3. Bowen, T. Renee & Baron, David & Nunnari, Salvatore, 2016. "Durable Coalitions and Communication: Public versus Private Negotiations," CEPR Discussion Papers 11613, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Hülya Eraslan & Kirill S. Evdokimov & Jan Zápal, 2022. "Dynamic Legislative Bargaining," Springer Books, in: Emin Karagözoğlu & Kyle B. Hyndman (ed.), Bargaining, chapter 0, pages 151-175, Springer.
    5. Vincent Anesi, 2018. "Dynamic Legislative Policy Making under Adverse Selection," Discussion Papers 2018-08, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    6. Jeon, Jee Seon & Hwang, Ilwoo, 2022. "The emergence and persistence of oligarchy: A dynamic model of endogenous political power," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).
    7. Kawamori, Tomohiko, 2019. "Bilateral bargaining with endogenous status quo," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
    8. David P Baron, 2018. "Elections and durable governments in parliamentary governments," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 30(1), pages 74-118, January.
    9. David P. Baron, 2019. "Simple dynamics of legislative bargaining: coalitions and proposal power," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 67(1), pages 319-344, February.
    10. Zapal, Jan, 2020. "Simple Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    11. Baron, David P. & Bowen, T. Renee, 2013. "Dynamic Coalitions," Research Papers 2128, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    12. Marina Azzimonti & Laura Karpuska & Gabriel Mihalache, 2020. "Bargaining over Mandatory Spending and Entitlements," Department of Economics Working Papers 20-02, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics.
    13. Wioletta Dziuda & Antoine Loeper, 2016. "Dynamic Collective Choice with Endogenous Status Quo," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 124(4), pages 1148-1186.
    14. Renee Bowen & Vincent Anesi, 2018. "Policy Experimentation, Redistribution and Voting Rules," NBER Working Papers 25033, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. T. Renee Bowen, 2015. "Legislated Protection And The World Trade Organization," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 56(4), pages 1349-1384, November.
    16. Tasos Kalandrakis, 2014. "Pareto efficiency in the dynamic one-dimensional bargaining model," Wallis Working Papers WP66, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
    17. Sonin, Konstantin & Egorov, Georgy & Diermeier, Daniel, 2016. "Political Economy of Redistribution," CEPR Discussion Papers 11285, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    18. Marina Azzimonti & Gabriel P. Mihalache & Laura Karpuska, 2020. "Bargaining over Taxes and Entitlements," NBER Working Papers 27595, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    19. Vincent Anesi & John Duggan, 2015. "Dynamic Bargaining and External Stability with Veto Players," Discussion Papers 2015-12, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    20. Anesi, Vincent & Duggan, John, 2017. "Dynamic bargaining and stability with veto players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 30-40.
    21. Vincent Anesi & Daniel J Seidmann, 2012. "Bargaining in Standing Committees," Discussion Papers 2012-09, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.

  10. Kfir Eliaz & Michael Richter & Ariel Rubinstein, 2011. "Choosing the two finalists," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 46(2), pages 211-219, February.

    Cited by:

    1. T Hayashi & R Jain & V Korpela & M Lombardi, 2020. "Behavioral Strong Implementation," IEAS Working Paper : academic research 20-A002, Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan.
    2. Igor Kopylov, 2022. "Minimal rationalizations," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 73(4), pages 859-879, June.
    3. Geng, Sen & Özbay, Erkut Y., 2021. "Shortlisting procedure with a limited capacity," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(C).
    4. Tserenjigmid, Gerelt, 2019. "Choosing with the worst in mind: A reference-dependent model," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 631-652.
    5. Adam Szeidl & Botond Koszegi, 2011. "A Model of Focusing in Economic Choice," 2011 Meeting Papers 1441, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    6. Kops, Christopher, 2022. "Cluster-shortlisted choice," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(C).
    7. Paola Manzini & Marco Mariotti & Christopher J. Tyson, 2016. "Partial Knowledge Restrictions on the Two-Stage Threshold Model of Choice," Working Papers 790, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    8. Salvador Barberà & Geoffroy De Cleppel & Alejandro Neme & Kareen Rozeen, 2020. "Order-k Rationality," Working Papers 4, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
    9. , & ,, 2012. "Reason-based choice: a bargaining rationale for the attraction and compromise effects," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(1), January.
    10. Yusufcan Masatlioglu & Daisuke Nakajima & Erkut Y. Ozbay, 2012. "Revealed Attention," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(5), pages 2183-2205, August.
    11. Castillo, Geoffrey, 2020. "The attraction effect and its explanations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 123-147.
    12. Karpov, Alexander, 2015. "A theory of knockout tournament seedings," Working Papers 0600, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
    13. Robert Sugden & Jiwei Zheng, 2015. "Do consumers take advantage of common pricing standards? An experimental investigation," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 15-12, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    14. Geng, Sen, 2022. "Limited consideration model with a trigger or a capacity," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(C).
    15. Manzini, Paola & Mariotti, Marco & Tyson, Christopher J., 2011. "Manipulation of Choice Behavior," IZA Discussion Papers 5891, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    16. Gent Bajraj & Levent Ülkü, 2015. "Choosing two finalists and the winner," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(4), pages 729-744, December.
    17. Chambers, Christopher P. & Yenmez, M. Bumin, 2018. "A simple characterization of responsive choice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 217-221.
    18. Salvador Barberà & Geoffroy de Clippel & Alejandro Neme & Kareen Rozen, 2022. "Order-k rationality," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 73(4), pages 1135-1153, June.
    19. Dayang Li, 2024. "Additive representation under idempotent attention," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 97(3), pages 563-583, November.
    20. Christopher Kops, 2018. "(F)Lexicographic shortlist method," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 65(1), pages 79-97, January.
    21. Salvador Barberà & Alejandro Neme, 2015. "Ordinal Relative Satisficing Behavior: Theory and Experiments," Working Papers 790, Barcelona School of Economics.
    22. Salador Barera & Kareen Rozen, 2018. "Good Enough," Working Papers 2018-12, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    23. Papi, Mauro, 2012. "Satisficing choice procedures," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 451-462.
    24. Manzini, Paola & Mariotti, Marco, 2018. "Dual random utility maximisation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 162-182.
    25. Lleras, Juan Sebastián & Masatlioglu, Yusufcan & Nakajima, Daisuke & Ozbay, Erkut Y., 2017. "When more is less: Limited consideration," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 170(C), pages 70-85.
    26. Meirav Aharon-Gutman, 2018. "Art’s failure to generate urban renewal: Lessons from Jerusalem," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 55(15), pages 3474-3491, November.
    27. Mauro Papi, 2014. "Noncompensatory consideration and compensatory choice: an application to Stackelberg competition," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 2(1), pages 53-63, April.
    28. Cherepanov, Vadim & Feddersen, Timothy & ,, 2013. "Rationalization," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(3), September.
    29. Georgios Gerasimou, 2016. "Partially dominant choice," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 61(1), pages 127-145, January.
    30. Spears Dean, 2011. "Intertemporal Bounded Rationality as Consideration Sets with Contraction Consistency," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-16, June.
    31. O. Volij & M. Mahajne, 2020. "The Individually Acceptable Choice Correspondence," Working Papers 2015, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.

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