Choosing two Finalists and the Winner

We study a class of boundedly rational choice functions, namely two-stage choosers, which operate as follows. The decision maker uses two criteria in two stages to make a choice. First she shortlists the top-2 alternatives, i.e. two ?nalists, according to one criterion. Next, she chooses the winner in this binary shortlist using the second criterion. The criteria are linear orders ranking the alternatives, and they may or may not be explicitly welfare-relevant. For example, they may re?ect the distinct preferences of a short-run- and a long-run-self. Alternatively the ?rst criterion may be a list which the decision maker uses to browse alternatives, while the second gives ces. Using the concepts of choice reversers in a set, i.e., alternatives whose removal from a set affect choice, and hidden choice of a set,i.e., the alternative chosen when the choice is removed, we give four logically independent axioms on choice behavior which jointly characterize two-stage choosers.