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Melis Kartal

Personal Details

First Name:Melis
Middle Name:
Last Name:Kartal
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pka978
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
https://sites.google.com/view/meliskartal
Welthandlesplatz 1, 1020 Vienna

Affiliation

WU Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien

Wien, Austria
http://www.wu.ac.at/
RePEc:edi:wiwieat (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Haeckl, Simone & Kartal, Melis, 2021. "Does a stereotype benefit women in the labor market: An experiment on perseverance," UiS Working Papers in Economics and Finance 2021/5, University of Stavanger.
  2. Melis Kartal & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2020. "Fake News, Voter Overconfidence, and the Quality of Democratic Choice," Discussion Papers 20-03, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  3. Melis Kartal & James Tremewan, 2016. "An offer you can refuse: the effects of transparency with endogenous conflict of interest," Vienna Economics Papers vie1602, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.

Articles

  1. Melis Kartal & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2022. "Fake News, Voter Overconfidence, and the Quality of Democratic Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 112(10), pages 3367-3397, October.
  2. Kartal, Melis & Müller, Wieland & Tremewan, James, 2021. "Building trust: The costs and benefits of gradualism," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 258-275.
  3. Kartal, Melis & Tremewan, James, 2018. "An offer you can refuse: The effect of transparency with endogenous conflict of interest," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 161(C), pages 44-55.
  4. Melis Kartal, 2018. "Honest Equilibria in Reputation Games: The Role of Time Preferences," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 10(1), pages 278-314, February.
  5. Melis Kartal, 2015. "Laboratory elections with endogenous turnout: proportional representation versus majoritarian rule," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 18(3), pages 366-384, September.
  6. Melis Kartal, 2015. "A Comparative Welfare Analysis of Electoral Systems with Endogenous Turnout," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 125(587), pages 1369-1392, September.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Melis Kartal & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2020. "Fake News, Voter Overconfidence, and the Quality of Democratic Choice," Discussion Papers 20-03, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Agneman, Gustav, 2022. "How economic expectations shape preferences for national independence: Evidence from Greenland," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    2. Thomas Markussen & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2023. "Is There a Dividend of Democracy? Experimental Evidence from Cooperation Games," CESifo Working Paper Series 10616, CESifo.
    3. Ralph-Christopher Bayer & Marco Faravelli & Carlos Pimienta, 2023. "The Wisdom of the Crowd: Uninformed Voting and the Efficiency of Democracy," Discussion Papers 2023-08, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
    4. Christopher Adamo & Jeffrey Carpenter, 2023. "Sentiment and the belief in fake news during the 2020 presidential primaries," Oxford Open Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 2, pages 512-547.

  2. Melis Kartal & James Tremewan, 2016. "An offer you can refuse: the effects of transparency with endogenous conflict of interest," Vienna Economics Papers vie1602, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. van Gils, Freek & Müller, Wieland & Prüfer, Jens, 2020. "Big Data and Democracy," Discussion Paper 2020-011, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    2. Felix Gottschalk, 2021. "Regulating Markets with Advice: An Experimental Study," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 83(1), pages 1-31, February.
    3. De Moragas, Antoni-Italo, 2022. "Disclosing decision makers’ private interests," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 150(C).

Articles

  1. Melis Kartal & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2022. "Fake News, Voter Overconfidence, and the Quality of Democratic Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 112(10), pages 3367-3397, October.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Kartal, Melis & Müller, Wieland & Tremewan, James, 2021. "Building trust: The costs and benefits of gradualism," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 258-275.

    Cited by:

    1. Boczoń, Marta & Vespa, Emanuel & Weidman, Taylor & Wilson, Alistair J, 2024. "Testing Models of Strategic Uncertainty: Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt7pk7c4gb, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.

  3. Kartal, Melis & Tremewan, James, 2018. "An offer you can refuse: The effect of transparency with endogenous conflict of interest," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 161(C), pages 44-55.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  4. Melis Kartal, 2018. "Honest Equilibria in Reputation Games: The Role of Time Preferences," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 10(1), pages 278-314, February.

    Cited by:

    1. Calzolari, G. & Felli, L. & Koenen, J. & Spagnolo, G. & Stahl, K. O., 2021. "Relational Contracts and Trust in a High-Tech Industry," Janeway Institute Working Papers 2101, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    2. , & Calzolari, Giacomo & Koenen, Johannes & Spagnolo, Giancarlo & Stahl, Konrad, 2019. "Trust, Investment and Competition: Theory and Evidence from German Car Manufacturers," CEPR Discussion Papers 13750, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Giacomo Calzolari & Leonardo Felli & Johannes Koenen & Giancarlo Spagnolo & Konrad Stahl, 2024. "Trust in Vertical Relations," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2024_530, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    4. Giacomo Calzolari & Leonardo Felli & Johannes Koenen & Giancarlo Spagnolo & Konrad O. Stahl, 2024. "Trust and Complexity in Vertical Relationships," CESifo Working Paper Series 11170, CESifo.
    5. Simon Martin & Karl H. Schlag, 2017. "Finite Horizon Holdup and How to Cross the River," Vienna Economics Papers vie1706, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
    6. Janas, Moritz & Oljemark, Emilia, 2020. "Trust and Reputation under Asymmetric Information," VfS Annual Conference 2020 (Virtual Conference): Gender Economics 224518, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    7. Kartal, Melis & Müller, Wieland & Tremewan, James, 2021. "Building trust: The costs and benefits of gradualism," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 258-275.
    8. Janas, Moritz & Oljemark, Emilia, 2021. "Trust and reputation under asymmetric information," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 185(C), pages 97-124.

  5. Melis Kartal, 2015. "Laboratory elections with endogenous turnout: proportional representation versus majoritarian rule," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 18(3), pages 366-384, September.

    Cited by:

    1. Chaturvedi, Sugat & Das, Sabyasachi, 2018. "Group Size and Political Representation Under Alternate Electoral Systems," MPRA Paper 88117, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Herrera, Helios & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol & McMurray, Joseph C., 2019. "Information aggregation and turnout in proportional representation: A laboratory experiment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 179(C).
    3. Philippos Louis & Orestis Troumpounis & Nikolaos Tsakas & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2020. "Protest voting in the laboratory," Working Papers 288072952, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
    4. Alan Gerber & Mitchell Hoffman & John Morgan & Collin Raymond, 2020. "One in a Million: Field Experiments on Perceived Closeness of the Election and Voter Turnout," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(3), pages 287-325, July.
    5. Morton, Rebecca B. & Ou, Kai, 2015. "What motivates bandwagon voting behavior: Altruism or a desire to win?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 40(PB), pages 224-241.
    6. Cesar Martinelli & Thomas R. Palfrey, 2017. "Communication and Information in Games of Collective Decision: A Survey of Experimental Results," Working Papers 1065, George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science.
    7. Agranov, Marina & Goeree, Jacob K. & Romero, Julian & Yariv, Leeat, 2016. "What makes voters turn out: The effects of polls and beliefs," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2016-206, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    8. Alessandra Casella & Jeffrey Guo & Michelle Jiang, 2021. "Minority Turnout and Representation under Cumulative Voting. An Experiment," NBER Working Papers 28674, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Francesco De Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni & Maria Vittoria Levati & Ivan Soraperra, 2016. "Electing a parliament: an experimental study," Working Papers 11/2016, University of Verona, Department of Economics.
    10. Helios Herrera & Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Joseph C. McMurray, 2016. "The Marginal Voter's Curse," Working Papers 798, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    11. Yoichi Hizen & Kazuya Kikuchi & Yukio Koriyama & Takehito Masuda, 2024. "Jumping on the bandwagon and off the Titanic: an experimental study of turnout in two-tier voting," Papers 2408.00265, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2024.
    12. Thomas R Palfrey & Kirill Pogorelskiy, 2019. "Communication Among Voters Benefits the Majority Party," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 129(618), pages 961-990.

  6. Melis Kartal, 2015. "A Comparative Welfare Analysis of Electoral Systems with Endogenous Turnout," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 125(587), pages 1369-1392, September.

    Cited by:

    1. Herrera, Helios & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol & McMurray, Joseph C., 2019. "Information aggregation and turnout in proportional representation: A laboratory experiment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 179(C).
    2. Kazuya Kikuchi & Yukio Koriyama, 2019. "The Winner-Take-All Dilemma," ISER Discussion Paper 1059r, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Dec 2019.
    3. Matveenko, Andrei & Valei, Azamat & Vorobyev, Dmitriy, 2022. "Participation quorum when voting is costly," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    4. Alastair Smith & Bruce Bueno de Mesquita & Tom LaGatta, 2017. "Group incentives and rational voting1," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 29(2), pages 299-326, April.
    5. Laurent Bouton & Micael Castanheira De Moura & Allan Drazen, 2020. "A Theory of Small Campaign Contributions," Working Papers ECARES 2020-43, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    6. Alberto Grillo, 2017. "Risk aversion and bandwagon effect in the pivotal voter model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 172(3), pages 465-482, September.
    7. Marco Faravelli & Kenan Kalayci & Carlos Pimienta, 2020. "Costly voting: a large-scale real effort experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 23(2), pages 468-492, June.
    8. Gersbach, Hans & Mamageishvili, Akaki & Tejada, Oriol, 2019. "The Effect of Handicaps on Turnout for Large Electorates: An Application to Assessment Voting," CEPR Discussion Papers 13921, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Leontiou, Anastasia & Manalis, Georgios & Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2023. "Bandwagons in costly elections: The role of loss aversion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 209(C), pages 471-490.
    10. Grüner, Hans Peter & Tröger, Thomas, 2018. "Linear voting rules," Working Papers 18-01, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.
    11. Mechtenberg, Lydia & Tyran, Jean-Robert, 2019. "Voter motivation and the quality of democratic choice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 241-259.
    12. Faravelli, Marco & Sanchez-Pages, Santiago, 2012. "(Don’t) Make My Vote Count," SIRE Discussion Papers 2012-07, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
    13. Melis Kartal, 2015. "Laboratory elections with endogenous turnout: proportional representation versus majoritarian rule," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 18(3), pages 366-384, September.
    14. Kemal Kıvanç Aköz & Alexei Zakharov, 2023. "Electoral turnout with divided opposition," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 60(3), pages 439-475, April.
    15. Dmitriy Vorobyev, 2022. "Information disclosure in elections with sequential costly participation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 190(3), pages 317-344, March.
    16. Kikuchi, Kazuya & Koriyama, Yukio, 2023. "The winner-take-all dilemma," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(3), July.
    17. Marco Faravelli & Priscilla Man, 2021. "Generalized majority rules: utilitarian welfare in large but finite populations," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(1), pages 21-48, July.
    18. Faravelli, Marco & Man, Priscilla & Walsh, Randall, 2015. "Mandate and paternalism: A theory of large elections," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 1-23.
    19. Marco Faravelli & Priscilla Man & Bang Dinh Nguyen, 2016. "Welfare comparison of electoral systems under power sharing," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(2), pages 413-429, August.
    20. Helios Herrera & Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Joseph C. McMurray, 2016. "The Marginal Voter's Curse," Working Papers 798, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    21. Maarten C. W. Janssen & Mariya Teteryatnikova, 2017. "Mystifying but not misleading: when does political ambiguity not confuse voters?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 172(3), pages 501-524, September.
    22. Dmitriy Vorobyev & Azamat Valei & Andrei Matveenko, 2023. "Approval vs. Participation Quorums," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2023_438, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 2 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-EXP: Experimental Economics (2) 2020-07-20 2022-01-03. Author is listed
  2. NEP-CBE: Cognitive and Behavioural Economics (1) 2020-07-20. Author is listed
  3. NEP-GEN: Gender (1) 2022-01-03. Author is listed
  4. NEP-HRM: Human Capital and Human Resource Management (1) 2022-01-03. Author is listed
  5. NEP-LMA: Labor Markets - Supply, Demand, and Wages (1) 2022-01-03. Author is listed
  6. NEP-POL: Positive Political Economics (1) 2020-07-20. Author is listed

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